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COURT

'3p«2..s,

Attorneys for Plaintiff Franklin Covey
Client Sales, Inc.
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

FRANKLIN COVEY CLIENT SALES,
INC., a Utah corporation,
COMPLAINT
(Declaratory Judgment Action)

Plaintiff,
v.
DAVID MELVIN, an individual,
Defendant.

civil Ko&jimnifotfoJiz
Judge

<fe PAVE SVQJTC

Plaintiff Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc., by and through its counsel Manning Curtis
Bradshaw & Bednar, LLC, and pursuant to Rule 57 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
complains of Defendant David Melvin and seeks relief as follows:
PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.

Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. ("Franklin Covey") is a Utah corporation doing

business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah and is a wholly owned subsidiary of Franklin Covey
Co.

#4189

2.

Defendant David Melvin ("Melvin") is a resident of the State of Maryland. Prior

to September 12, 1997, Melvin was an employee of Franklin Covey. On one or more occasions
during his employment with Franklin Covey Melvin worked and performed services in Utah and
solicited customers in the State of Utah. Melvin is subject to the personal jurisdiction of this
Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24.
3.

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Utah Code

Ann. §§78-3-4 and 78-33-1.
4.

Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-13-4, 78-13-6

and 78-13-7.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
5.

Prior to September 12,1997, Melvin was employed by Franklin Covey as an

Account Executive.
6.

On September 12,1997, Melvin's employment with Franklin Covey was

terminated.
7.

Prior to Melvin's separation, Franklin Covey had established a policy and practice

providing that Account Executives were ineligible to receive commissions on seminars held or
products sold subsequent to the effective date of the Account Executives1 termination (the
"Commission Policy").
8.

The Commission Policy is appropriate and justified because booked seminars may

be canceled by Franklin Covey's client prior to the time the seminar is actually held, because the
number of attendees for any given seminar may change up until the day of the seminar and
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because there is on-going work associated with holding a seminar which continues until the
seminar has been concluded.
9.

On November 13, 1997, approximately two months after his separation from

Franklin Covey, Melvin received payment of $2,029.57 from Franklin Covey and signed a
Release (the "Release") in which he released Franklin Covey "from all liability arising out of its
failure to pay [Melvin] commissions for sales completed before [Melvin's] termination on
September 12, 1997." A copy of the Release is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
10.

On or about February 8,1998, approximately five months after Melvin's

termination and approximately three months after Melvin executed the Release, Franklin Covey
received a demand letter and Draft Complaint from legal counsel for Melvin demanding payment
of compensation for potential future sales from prospective customers and asserting entitlement
to commissions on seminars which may be held after the effective date of Melvin's resignation.
Melvin's Draft Complaint demands payment of $600,000. Melvin threatens litigation if such
commissions for potential future sales are not paid. A copy of the Draft Complaint is attached
hereto as Exhibit B.
11.

Melvin's Draft Complaint acknowledges the Commission Policy by stating "[i]t

was Franklin's practice not to pay commissions to Melvin until Franklin actually delivered the
product or service." Exhibit B, f 7.
12.

Melvin admits in the Draft Complaint that he has been paid "commissions for all

sales of services and products that were delivered before September 12,1997." Exhibit B, 18.
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13.

An actual justiciable controversy now exists between Franklin Covey and Melvin

as to whether Melvin is entitled to receive compensation for potential future sales or for seminars
held after the effective date of his termination.
14.

Franklin Covey is an interested party pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-2, and

is entitled to have determined the question of whether any obligation exists to pay compensation
to Melvin for seminars held subsequent to the effective date of Melvin's termination and to
obtain a declaration of the rights, obligations and status of the parties.
15.

By rendering a declaratory judgment or decree, the controversy giving rise to this

proceeding will be terminated.

CLAIM FOR REUgF
(Declaratory Judgment)

16.

By this reference, Franklin Covey incorporates the averments previously set forth

above as though fully set forth herein.
17.

Because Melvin has alleged entitlement to compensation and commission

payments subsequent to the effective date of his termination, Franklin Covey is a "person
interested" under Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-2 and is entitled to have determined questions of
construction, rights and obligations arising from Melvin's employment with Franklin Covey and
to obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.
18.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-5, a declaratory judgment will end the

controversy arising under the Agreement.
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PRAYER FOR RELIgF
WHEREFORE, Franklin Covey seeks relief as follows:
1.

For a declaration of the rights, status, legal relations and obligations of the parties

arising from Melvin's employment with Franklin Covey and Franklin Covey's Commission
Policy, including a declaration that Franklin Covey has no obligation to pay Melvin
compensation or commissions for potential future sales or for seminars scheduled or products
sold subsequent to the effective date of Melvin's termination; and
2.

A declaration that the Release signed by Melvin on November 13, 1997 bars the

claim asserted in Melvin's Draft Complaint (Exhibit B) as well as any and all other claims related
to payment of compensation or commissions for services performed by Melvin during his
employment with Franklin Covey; and
3.

A declaration that Franklin Covey's policy and practice with respect to the

payment of commissions to separated account executives is otherwise not violative of law.
DATED this \3r

day of February, 1998.

MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW
&BEDNAR,LLC

Steven C. Bednar
Candice Anderson
Attorneys for Plaintiff Franklin Covey Client
Sales, Inc.
Plaintiffs Address:
2200 West Parkway Blvd.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119
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EXHIBIT A

Release
I, David Mehrin, in consideration of the sum of $2,029.57 (less any applicable
federal, state, and local taxes and other withholdings) hereby release Franklin Covey Co.
from aU liability arising out of itsfailureto pay me commissions for sales completed
before my termination on September 12,1997. This release becomes effective upon my
receipt of payment in the amount of $2,029.57. For purposes of this release, any
reference to Franklin Covey Co. also includes all officers and employees of Franklin
Covey Co. as well; as any affiliated companies.
\
Date:

(4ux_

fiw^bju ii» \<m
David Melvin

NOU-13-1997

12:48

P. 004

EXHIBIT B

rv% 4-Vna

r»4

Tircuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland
or

I

the United States District Court for Maryland
Greenbelt Division

David Melvin
812 Whittington Terrace
Silver Spring, Maryland
Plaintiff
v.
Franklin Covey Company
Serve: Hyrum W. Smith
2200 West Parkway Blvd.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84
Defendant
:.
r _i

Complaint
(Contract)
David Melvin, through his attorney, Mar1

o

. .•

failure t , :.-i; - i . ^ commissions

Hessel, makes

**.-

;\ * u^

made while employed by the defendant.--1
IM r t. .1 m s

1.

The plaintiff, David Melvin ("Melvin"), i s an adult resident

f Maryland residing at 812 Whittington Terrace, Silver Spring,
•

2.

-

....

T h e d e f e n d a n t , F r a n k l i n C o v e y C o , , i n c . ("Franklir" x

U t a h corporatior

?ranklin does business

Mary Land! ruin

J neii of f: ices i inn «"i!a i I

1

the S t a t e

A

~ i

times relevant to this suit.
Jurisdiction and Venue
3-

.

s

and Judiw. *: Proceedings Article-of the Annotated Code of
!:

Mary land.
*

i

''•• \
|

,

\ I

or

1

//

Jurisdiction In this case is""based on or 2 8 U.S.C. § 1332.
4.

_based..;Oi:i § § b-- J.\) I audi 6 - ,J ,)

•:

Courts and Judicial Proceedings A r t i c l e of the .Annotated Code of
I 'lary land!,

\ "~"\ .

or

,• •, ,„

\ x^

Venue in this court is based on 2 8 U.S.C § 1391.
Facts
5.

Franklin is and for a period "of years has been, engaged in

the business

- selling personal productivi ty training,

consul tinij bei v ices and pi udiira\s

un.l inn it J » aI i o n a I I; apt; i .tini Il

books.
h

T h e p l a i n t i f f , M e l v i n , w a s a; employee of Franklin or its

y i edeccLiM HI «"i ninpan i *-.»b 1 i i nn

•* •

- - 1:.ember

I ."' „ I "^"'l 7 .

During this time, he was employed -%s - salesman and presenter.
Melvin earned part or a] 1 of his compensation from Franklin in
-

r

•" ••

wh±.~
commission;

-.

:ii : > i is

—

-

;—- -

employed by Franklin, Melvin was entitled to receive
sales that he was responsible for procuring.
l e n t i f t e d IM:M t a i HI i i r i 'ruiiif ' "ii as

accounts so that he would be paid a commission ™

»ny sales to

those clients, whether or not the orders '+*-:* placed through
•e i
Mel .
8.

ommissions to

uiu._ Franklin actually-delivered the product or service.

Frank.in terminated Melvin from his employment with the
Melvin
y severance .,;

terminate:

v: compensation x;, onnection with

Is

Ai;t>^ Franklin terminated Melvin's employment,
-sions for ii I I sal <=»:'. of services and

products that were delivered before September
9.

Franklin failed *

L"P

1111,

pay Melvin commissions that he had earned

iulci ihi. iiriit i art •.

into prior t

.

employment, but for which Franklin had not ye - -Ielivered tl:ic-ji
service

product,
*' • > ''••

1J y

requires salesmen ;.„^ contact a potential customer, spend hours
learning about the customer's business, develop an understanding
Hi" Un

niut niiitM ti hi" i I ii it 11HI iiHf'ds

nnI i ilinMtf» f IIP customer about

how Franklin's services and products would meet the customei"s
needs•

u

11.

'-•-

are rarely signed when \
prospective customer.
between tl
Competitor

"at sales contracts

sales person ; fc :s ( . contacts a

Sales are made based oi I a relationship

customer m u Franklin that

sales person develops.

•-: ; -. . ;n have products and services that fi ] ] tl le

same needs as Franklin's products and services, so the

relationship that the sales person develops is a critical factor
i n a sale.

The relationship •

help Franklin sell other

produc t::s '

i e s p o n s it b l e If i u I

customer

1:1: le

\e sales contracts..--"are often signed months or ev en

years.after the sales person-does the w o r k of developing the
j'i e 1 a 1 1 o n i;«I in i \J u " '''""
12.

Melvin sper

<: 11 s t; o n i e i:.

/ ;'

large percentage of his time meeting with

prospective customers and educating them about Franklir
ser v ices ai :i I pi: odi IC l::s

He received i:i ::> • sompensatj on fc:

> isa.

efforts on Franklin's behalf. •__---:'
Af

*^*t eiq** customers placed orders -

Franklin,
:, recei i i e

ember 12, 19 the services or products before September

Franklin

failed to pay a commission to Mfelvin for these sales. These
customers incl ude:

//

a.

Northrop Grummon

b,

A m o c o , I IK

C.

H h o n e Pou Lenc*

d.

Price Waterhouse

e.

Bell Atlantic

f.

c

g.

Aramark

h.

Pershing

\ \

/{

r

S '•••

:

7]

di_L

14 . Al I .Iin! o n e i u.sfomHr

Be 1,1 ," " 'Jl

•' • *'• "

with Franklin after September 12, 1997 -.
Melvin's sales efforts,

Franklin __-^ _

4

••

" or J" '

, ._ • result
paid Melvi. a

c o m m i s s i o n on the Bellcore sales or any other sales t o Melvin's
accounts w h e r e t h e order w a s placed after September 12
15 .

•i

] 99.7,
t :: • iiH't'f

with potent LaJ customers of-•Franklin to help develop a
relationship.

? particular, Melvin met wi th representatives of

< ihi Md I c i m i IIM
efforts resultec ,
Frankl in

] 6.

< :*• development of a major new customer for

Franklin has not compensated Melvin for his efforts

At least some of the others-prospective customers that Melvin

spent hi s time meeting wi th and educating wil 1 place orders with
Frank] :i i i

Oi I September ] 2

1997" when Fr ankl :i i I tei in :i n a te • :il M e ] i i n,

he had b u s i n e s s proposals pending w i t h approximately

potential

customers • T h e r e .<? ? * Lgh likelihood that a large percentage of
these

-

-

"''ie neax f u t u r e .
• Exhibit

5

1ii

Some of these prospective customers are listed
*

*omplair

* a d d i t i o n , Melvin had
: :c x:i mate] j 539 • ::: ther

potential customers in his territory.
th

a significant percentage

f

There i s a hi gh likelihood

these prospective customers will

p] a< :::e
approximately 613 prospective customers (including those found i n
Exhibit I\ ) i s attached as Exhibit B to thi s complaint
17 .

f :::: i:

e- itica te ai id

relationships with prospective customers, Frank
making as many sales.
5

* would not be

18.

Franklin benefited from Melvin's sales efforts w n n

prospective customers

Franklin knew that Melvin was contacting

and i»d11cat

behalf

:i 9 - Franklin accepted the benefit of Melvin's sales efforts on
::i ts behalf and has profited from those efforts.

Franklin did not

comperibd! e H*-1 J : i i i
Count I
20.

The plaintiff hereby restates and incorporates b y reference

i 11 J ::> f t: I: i € • a Il ] e g a t ::1 ::: i I s • z o n t a i n e d I
complaint.

;.~r"-'
substantial effort 4* d e v e l o p prospective

Melvin made
•J.-..terminated
22.
Me]

--ink. -\

t o September
employment.

Benefits w e r e conferred upbn Franklir
:i :i:

result

.•.-..:

:
- •m a l

sales.
23.
I ""1

Franklin encouraged Melv:- * : develop prospective customers
Yl d l l k 1 i ii

' MS

lllliik I I I . |

.III

i "' f f Ol t

tO

sell its products a n d services and .that it w o u l d receive orders
as a res ii J t .
24.

;:

J

f* i

efforts without

compensating
. !•

* -

•-* inequitable i.-;r Franklin t o retain the benefits
-

!

unpensating h i m .

Franklin h a d ,.... implied contract with Mel^-commission on all sales h e procured.

Franklin breached the"

implied contract with Melvin and was unjustly enriched as a
] esu 1 1" .

Wherefore/ the p l a i n t ! ff demands |iiui|iii<jm dh i u i i w.
(a)

compensatory damages in. the- amount of $600,000.00; and

^j

u n e r r e ii e f

that the court deems appropriate.
i

j

_.. -Respectful 1 y submitted,

.Mark L. Hesse1, Esq.
Suite 307
11501 Georgia Avenue
Wheaton, Maryland 20902
(301) 949-8364
"Attorney for the plaintiff
Trial

Demand

The plaintiff demands a jury',.trial ot \\\

issues in this

case.
Mark L. Hessel, Esq.

J

Tai

)

F/Ltt)
/ "

MANNING CURTIS BRADSIIA W
& BEDNAR, LLC
Steven C. Bednar #5660
Candice Anderson #7456
370 East South Temple, Suite .100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)363-5678

U

*-0

* ° ' « « / ..; 1

5V:__
Dtp

Attorneys for Plaintiff Franklin Covey
Client Sales, Inc.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

FRANKLIN COVEY CLIENT SALES,
INC., a Utah corporation,

)
)
)

MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

v.

)

Civil No. 2:98CV155

DAVTD MELVIN, an individual,

)

Judge Dee V. Benson

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

)

Plaintiff Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. ("Franklin Covey") move* tin -. I 'uuil lm <m
order granting summary judgment in this Declaratory Judgment Action. Franklin Covey seeks a
declaration that it has no obligation to pay Plaintiff David Melvin ("Melvin") commissions for
s.ilcs ol ptuducl'i .ind

SC-IVH cs

which n< cur after the termination of his employment from

Franklin Covey. Franklin Covey is entitled to a declaratory judgment as a matter of law because
the express terms oi Mdun's L-mplmiiiciil ,igu:eiiicnl innvuk's th.il Mclun wa> cnhilcii lo
payment "only for those services delivered while you are employed by Franklin."

i 1
#4629

w*
I

This Motion is supported by the accompanying Memorandum In Support of Motion for
iiiinmur. Illiiiiiluijiieiil .irul llu i n h i b i t s a t t a c h e d thereto.

DATED this 1 Oth of April, 1998.

MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW
& BEDNAR, LLC

Steven C. Bednar
Candice Anderson
Attorneys for Plaintiff Franklin Cove\ Client
Sales, Inc.

#4629

<H

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be mailed, postage prepaid, this /c ^ day of April, 1998 to the
following:
David Melvin
812 Whittington Terrace
Silver Spring, MD 20902
Mark L. Hessel, Esq.
Suite 307
11501 Georgia Avenue
Wheaton, MD 20902
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Tab 4

MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW
& BEDNAR, LLC
Steven C. Bednar #5660
Candice Anderson #7456
370 East South Temple, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)363-5678
Attorneys for Plaintiff Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

FRANKLIN COVEY CLIENT SALES,
INC., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,
v.
DAVID MELVIN, an individual,

]
])
>
]}

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

. )]

CivilNo.2:98CV155

i

Judge Dee V. Benson

Defendant.

Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff Franklin Covey
Client Sales, Inc. ("Franklin Covey") respectfully submits this Memorandum In Support of
Motion For Summary Judgment. Franklin Covey seeks a declaration that it has no obligation to
pay Plaintiff David Melvin ("Melvin") commissions for sales of products and services which
occur after the termination of his employment from Franklin Covey. Franklin Covey is entitled
to a declaratory judgment as a matter of law because the express terms of Melvin's employment
agreement provide that Melvin was entitled to payment "only for those services delivered while
you are employed by Franklin."

#4628
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I

\

INTRODUCTION
Melvin was employed by Franklin Covey as a salesman from January 1992 until
September 12, 1997. Prior to the spring of 1997 Melvin was paid a base salary plus commission.
In April 1997, Melvin was informed that his employment would be terminated for inadequate
sales. Melvin requested to keep his job on a straight commission basis. Franklin Covey agreed
and the parties executed an express agreement, which confirmed Franklin Covey's long-standing
policy respecting payment of commissions as follows: "According to Franklin policy,
commissions are paid only for those services delivered while you are employed by Franklin''
Melvin's employment was terminated on September 12,1997. It is undisputed that
Melvin has received payment for all sales which occurred prior to his termination. However,
Melvin now claims a quantum meruit entitlement to commissions on sales which occurred after
his termination and to commission on potential future sales to my potential future customer with
whom he had contact. Melvin's fantastic claim defies the law and the express Agreement which
governs his compensation. Franklin Covey is entitled to a declaration that it has no obligation to
pay Melvin commissions for sales or services delivered after the termination of his employment.

#4628
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STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
This declaratory judgment action was precipitated by Melvin sending to Franklin Covey a
draft complaint and threatening to sue unless Franklin Covey acquiesced to Melvin's ridiculous
demand for payment of post-termination commissions. Franklin Covey filed this declaratory
judgment action on February 13,1998, which was removed to this Court by Melvin.
Approximately three weeks after this declaratory judgment action was filed, Melvin filed a
complaint almost identical to the draft complaint in the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland (Melvin's "Maryland Complaint"). The following undisputed facts are
drawn from Melvins' Maryland Complaint (Exhibit A),1 Melvin's Compensation Agreement
(Exhibit B) and a Release signed by Melvin (Exhibit C).
1.

Melvin was employed as a Franklin Covey salesman from November 1,1995

until September 12, 1997. Exhibit A, Md. Complaint 17.
2.

In April 1997, Melvin signed a Compensation Agreement confirming that his

compensation structure was altered "from base + commission to straight commission." The
Compensation Agreement expressly provided: "According to Franklin policy, commissions
are paid only for those services delivered while you are employed by Franklin." Exhibit B,
Compensation Agreement, p. 1 (emphasis added).

Rather than answering this Declaratory Judgment Complaint, Melvin has chosen to file a Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. As a result, undisputed facts in this Memorandum have been drawn from
Melvin's Maryland Complaint rather than Melvin's responsive pleading in this action.
#4628
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3.

Melvin's employment was terminated on September 12, 1997. "After Franklin

terminated Melvin's employment, Franklin paid Melvin commissions for all sales of services and
products that were delivered before September 12, 1997." Exhibit A, Md. Complaint f 9.
Melvin signed a Release acknowledging receipt of payment "for sales completed before my
termination on September 12, 997." Exhibit C, Release.
4.

Melvin's draft Complaint and the Maryland Complaint demand payment for sales

or services delivered after Melvin's termination and commissions for my potential future sales to
any potential future customers with whom Melvin alleges he had contact. See Exhibit B to the
Complaint in this action; see also Exhibit A hereto.
ARGUMENT
Melvin's Quantum Meruit Claim is Precluded by the
Express Agreement Governing Melvin's Compensation
Franklin Covey seeks a declaration that it has no obligation to pay Melvin commissions
for sales or services delivered after his termination.2 Franklin Covey is entitled to this
declaratory relief because Melvin's claim for recovery under quantum meruit is, as a matter of
law, absolutely precluded by the express agreement governing Melvin's compensation (Exhibit
B).

Specifically, the Complaint requests the following declaratory relief:
1.
For a declaration of the rights, status, legal relations and obligations of the parties arising from
Melvin's employment with Franklin Covey and Franklin Covey's Commission Policy, including a declaration that
Franklin Covey has no obligation to pay Melvin compensation or commissions for potential future sales or for
seminars scheduled or products sold subsequent to the effective date of Melvin's termination; and
2.
A declaration that the Release signed by Melvin on November 13, 1997 bars the claim asserted in
Melvin's Draft Complaint (Exhibit B) as well as any and all other claims related to payment of compensation or
commissions for services performed by Melvin during his employment with Franklin Covey; and
3.
A declaration that Franklin Covey's policy and practice with respect to the payment of
commissions to separated account executives is otherwise not violative of law.
#4628
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According to the express agreement governing Melvin's compensation (and Franklin
Covey's undisputed policy), Melvin was to be paid commissions "only for those products and
services delivered while [he was] employed by Franklin." Exhibit B, Compensation Agreement
p. 1. Melvin accepted and signed the Compensation Agreement. Id.
It is undisputed that Melvin has been paid all commissions for services and products
delivered as of the date of termination. Exhibit A, Md. Complaint at % 9 ("After Franklin
terminated Melvin's employment, Franklin paid Melvin commissions for all sales of services and
products that were delivered before September 12, 1997"); see also Exhibit C, Release ("I, David
Melvin, in consideration of the sum of $2,029.57... release Franklin Covey Co. from all liability
arising out of its failure to pay me commissions for sales completed before my termination on
September 12,1997."). Melvin cannot contend that he is owed commissions for any sales or
services delivered prior to his termination date and his Compensation Agreement absolutely
forecloses any claim for commissions after his termination date.
Melvin's only argument to receive post-termination commissions is raised under quantum
meruit3. This claim is frivolous because a claim under "quantum meruit presupposes that no
enforceable written or oral contract exists." Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264,268 (Ut. Ct. App.
1987). See also, Concrete Products Co. v. Salt Lake County, 734 P.2d 910, 911 (Utah 1987)
("Unjust enrichment is a doctrine under which the law will imply a promise to pay for goods or
services when there is neither an actual nor an implied contract between the parties."); Davies,

Melvin's draft Complaint (Exhibit B to the Declaratory Judgment Complaint) and Melvin's Maryland
Complaint (Exhibit A hereto) confuses the distinction between a claim for unjust enrichment and a claim for
implied-contract, both of which are different species of quantum meruit, but each of which are absolutely barred by
the existence of an express agreement. See Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 268-269 (Ut. Ct. App. 1987).
#4628
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746 P.2d at 268 ("Quantum meruit is an action initiated by a plaintiff to recover payment for
labor performed in a variety of circumstances in which that plaintiff, for some reason, would not
be able to sue on an express contract."). This same principle governs under Maryland as well as
Utah law. Mass Transit Admin, v. Granite Constr. Co., 471 A.2d 1121, 1126 (Md. Ct. App.
1984) ("When there is an express construct dealing specifically with the services rendered,
quantum meruit is unavailable.").
Melvin's Compensation Agreement is an express agreement, the terms of which deal
precisely with the circumstances under which Melvin is entitled to commissions. That express
agreement limits compensation to commission for services and products delivered as of the date
of termination. Melvin has received payment according to those precise terms. Melvinfs
quantum meruit claim is instantly and totally decimated by the existence of that express
agreement.

CONCLUSION
Melvin acknowledges that he is owed no commissions for any sales or services delivered
prior to his termination. Melvinfs Compensation Agreement absolutely forecloses any claim for
commissions after his termination date. Summary judgment should be granted in favor of
Franklin Covey and a Declaratory Judgment entered granting the relief requested in Franklin
Covey's Complaint.

\w>

DATED this 10th day of April 1998.
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW
& BEDNAR, LLC

Steven C. Bednar
Candice Anderson
Attorneys for Plaintiff Franklin Covey Client
Sales, Inc.

#4628

loi

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be mailed, postage prepaid, this
10th day of April 1998, to the following:
David Melvin
812 Whittington Terrace
Silver Spring, MD 20902
Mark L. Hessel, Esq.
Suite 307
11501 Georgia Avenue
Wheaton, MD 20902
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EXHIBIT A

WORKING CQP)

In the United States District Cou2ffc:£or Maryland^
Greenbelt Division

1^3 m -3 P 2- U3
David Melvin
812 Whittington Terrace
Silver Spring, Maryland 20902
Plaintiff

v.
Franklin Covey Company
2200 West Parkway Blvd.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119

Civil Case No

./rt'V

(,5S

and
Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc,
2200 West Parkway Blvd.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119
Defendants

Complaint
(Contract and Declaratory Judgment)
David Melvin, through his attorney, Mark L. Hessel, makes
the following complaint against the defendants, Franklin Covey
Co. and Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. for failure to pay
sales commissions on sales that he made while employed by
Franklin Covey Co. under Maryland common law and for declaratory
relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 that the defendants are obligated
to pay commissions to the plaintiff on future sales for a period
of time.
Parties
1.

The plaintiff, David Melvin ("Melvin"), is an adult resident

of Maryland residing at 812 Whittington Terrace, Silver Spring,

1

\

&

Maryland 20901.
2.

The defendant, Franklin Covey Co. ("Franklin") is a Utah

corporation.

Franklin does business in the State of Maryland and

maintained offices in Gaithersburg, Maryland at all times
relevant to this suit.
3.

The defendant, Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. ("Client

Sales") is a Utah corporation.

On information and belief, Client

Sales is a wholly owned subsidiary of Franklin.
registered to do business in Maryland.

Client Sales is

Client Sales maintains

that it has an interest in the plaintiff's claim against
Franklin.
Jurisdiction and Venue
4.

Jurisdiction in this case is based on or 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

5.

Venue in this court is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
Facts

6.

Franklin is, and for a period of years has been, engaged in

the business of selling personal productivity training,
consulting services and products, and motivational tapes and
books.
7.

The plaintiff, Melvin, was an employee of Franklin or its

predecessor companies from January 1992 to September 12, 1997.
During this time, he was employed as a salesman and presenter.
Melvin earned part or all of his compensation from Franklin in
the form of commissions.
8.

While employed by Franklin, Melvin was entitled to receive

commissions on all sales that he was responsible for procuring.

2

Franklin internally identified certain accounts as Melvin's
accounts so that he would be paid a commission on any sales to
those clients, whether or not the orders were placed through
Melvin.

Franklin did not usually pay commissions to* Melvin until

Franklin actually delivered the product or service.
9.

Franklin terminated Melvin from his employment with the

company as of September 12, 1997. Franklin did not pay Melvin
any severance or other compensation in connection with his
termination.

After Franklin terminated Melvin's employment,

Franklin paid Melvin commissions for all sales of services and
products that were delivered before September 12, 1997.
10.

Franklin failed to pay Melvin commissions that he had earned

on sales contracts entered into prior to the termination of his
employment, but for which Franklin had not yet delivered the
service or product.
11.

The sale of Franklin's products and services generally

requires salesmen to contact a potential customer, spend hours
learning about the customer's business, develop an understanding
of the customer's training needs, and educate the customer about
how Franklin's services and products would meet the customer's
needs.
12.

It is the nature of Franklin's business that sales contracts

are rarely signed when the sales person first contacts a
prospective customer.

Sales are made based on a relationship

between the customer and Franklin that the sales person develops.
Competitors of Franklin have products and services that fill the
3

same needs as Franklin's products and services, so the
relationship that the sales person develops is a critical factor
in a sale. The relationship may also help Franklin sell other
products that the sales person is not responsible for to the
customer.

The sales contracts are often signed months or even

years after the sales person does the work of developing the
relationship with the customer.
13. Melvin spent a large percentage of his time meeting with
prospective customers and educating them about Franklin's
services and products. He received no compensation for these
efforts on Franklin's behalf.
14. At least eight customers placed orders with Franklin,
through Melvin, before September 12, 1997, but did not receive
the services or products before September 12, 1997. Franklin
failed to pay a commission to Melvin for these sales. These

a.

Northrop Grummon

b.

Amoco, UK

c.

Rhone Poulenc

d.

Price Waterhouse

e.

Bell Atlantic

f.

Giant Foods, Inc.

g-

Aramark

h.

Pershing

15. At least one customer, Bellcore, placed one or more orders
with Franklin after September 12, 1997 as a direct result of

4

Melvin's sales efforts,

Franklin has not paid Melvin a

commission on the Bellcore sales or any other sales to Melvin's
accounts where the order was placed after September 12, 1997.
16.

On one or more ocassions, Melvin traveled to Utah to meet

with potential customers of Franklin to help develop a
relationship.

In particular, Melvin met with representatives of

GEC-Marconi Hazeltine in Salt Lake City in May 1997. Melvin's
efforts resulted in the development of a major new customer for
Franklin.

Franklin has not compensated Melvin for his efforts

with GEC-Marconi Hazeltine.
17.

At least some of the other prospective customers that Melvin

spent his time meeting with and educating will place orders with
Franklin.

On September 12, 1997 when Franklin terminated Melvin,

he had business proposals pending with approximately 74 potential
customers. There is a high likelihood that a large percentage of
these prospective customers will place orders with Franklin in
the near future.

Some of these prospective customers are listed

in Exhibit A to this complaint.

In addition, Melvin had

developed business contacts with approximately 539 other
potential customers in his territory.

There is a high likelihood

that a significant percentage of these prospective customers will
place orders with Franklin in the near future. A list of
approximately 613 prospective customers (including those found in
Exhibit-A) is attached as Exhibit B to this complaint.
18.

But for Melvin's efforts to educate and develop

relationships with prospective customers, Franklin would not be
5

making as many sales.
19.

Franklin benefited from Melvin's sales efforts with

prospective customers.

Franklin knew that Melvin was contactdLng

and educating prospective customers on Franklin's behalf.
20.

Franklin accepted the benefit of Melvin's sales efforts on

its behalf and has profited from those efforts. Franklin did not
compensate Melvin in any way for his efforts.
Count I
(Contract)
21.

The plaintiff hereby restates and incorporates by reference

all of the allegations contained in the other paragraphs of this
complaint.
22.

Melvin made a substantial effort to develop prospective

clients for Franklin prior to September 12, 1997 when Franklin
terminated his employment.
23.

Benefits were conferred upon Franklin as a result of

Melvin's efforts.

These benefits were in the form of additional

sales.
24.

Franklin encouraged Melvin to develop prospective customers

for Franklin.

Franklin knew that Melvin was making an effort to

sell its products and services and that it would receive orders
as a result.
25.

Franklin accepted the benefits of Melvin's efforts without

compensating him.
26.

It would be inequitable for Franklin to retain the benefits

of Melvin's efforts without compensating him.

6

27.

Franklin had an implied contract with Melvin to pay him a

commission on all sales he procured.

Franklin breached the

implied contract with Melvin and was unjustly enriched as a
result.
Wherefore, the plaintiff demands judgment as follows:
(a)

compensatory damages in the amount of $600,000.00; and

(b)

any other relief that the court deems appropriate.
Count II
(Declaratory Judgment)

28.

The plaintiff hereby restates and incorporates by reference

all of the allegations contained in the other paragraphs of this
complaint.
29.

Some of the sales, for which the plaintiff is claiming a

right to compensation, will not be known until some time in the
future.

As such it may not be possible to establish fixed

amounts of damages at trial.
30.

f

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, this court may grant a declaratory

judgment to the plaintiff to establish the plaintiff's right to
receive compensation, even when the exact amount of the
compensation is not known.
Wherefore, the plaintiff demands judgment as follows:
(a)

declaratory judgment that the plaintiff is entitled to

compensation at a given rate for future purchases that his
customers make from the defendants; and
(b)

any other relief that the court deems appropriate.

7

Respectfully submitted,

I'llcJ}

HHd^-~

Mark L. Hessel, Esq.
Suite 307
11501 Georgia Avenue
Wheaton, Maryland 20902
(301) 949-8364
Attorney for the plaintiff
Demand for Jury Trial

The plaintiff demands a jury trial of all issues in this
case. .

r\cu
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Mark L. Hessel, Esq.
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Consulting Group
T-nrmtr-y Sh-plsy Associates

April 9, 1997

OavidMelvin
812 Whittington Terrace
Silver Springs, MD 20901
Oear Oavid:
This letter will oonfirm your conversation with Jeff Shumway on April 8, 1997, where you
discussed the terms of your continued smployment with Franklin under a new
compensation structure. Specifically:
•

Effective Date: This change will be effective Aprff 5,1997.

•

Compensation; Your compensation structure will move from-base +
commission to straight commission. Your commission shall be nine percent of
the net contribution of anything you self. Commission shall be paid on the 20*
of the month following the month in which services are delivered. According to
FranWIn policy, commissions are paid only for those services delivered while
you are employed by FrankHn.
As discussed, the commission percentage will be adjusted to seventeen percent
when your sales exceed the $650,000 goal established for the year.

•

Office and Phone: Franklin agrees to provide an office and phone in our
Qa'rthersburg facility for your use. You may continue to use the AT&T phone
card when you are traveling or making client callsfromhome.

•

Travel Budget: You may continue to use (he existing travel budget Please
approve all travel through Matt King,

•

Benefits: Your medical, dental, and life insurance benefits wtll continue at your
current levels. As a fully commissioned employee, you will not accrue personal
time nor wilt you receive holiday or floating holiday pay. Payment for personal
time accrued up through April 4,1997. has been paid with your final check as a
salaried employee.

•

Potential to Renegotiate the Agreement: This agreement may be
renegotiated at the end of the fiscal year, based on individual and company
performance.

qwpppybatw
Your responsibilities will continue to focus on sales and business development. Your
responsibilities will be subject to change from time to time as the company goes
forward.
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April 9,1997
Page Two
At-Will Empiovmyj

Your employment with Franklin will be on an at-will basis. This m%Mm that your
employment is completely voluntary and for an indefinite term and th*t it may be
terminated by you or by franklin at any Dme,forany reason or for no reason, and with
or without advance notice. Your status as en at-will employee may not be changed or
modified by any oral representations to the contrary made by any supervisor, officer, or
other employer or agent of Franklin, by any practice or procedure of Franklin or in the
industry in which you are employed, and/or by any policy manual or other document
issued by Franklin, EXCEPT rf a written employment contract is executed by you and by
the president of Franklin which specifically revokes the employment at-will relationship.
No manager, supervisor, officer or other employee of FrankRn has the power or
authority, either verbaOy or In witting, to alter the employee at-will relationship except as
specifically described in this paragraph.
Confidentiality and Covenant Not to Compete
Your current Employment Agreement Is stffl valid and in force.
If you accept this offer of employment on the terms and conditions set forth in this letter
and the accompanying Employment Agreement, please sign this letter In the space
Indicated below and return it to terrain Smith, FranWIn Quest Consulting Group, 2200
West Parkway Boulevard, Third ROOT. Salt Lake City, UT 84119.
oincereiy,

Jj^/c.lJmi'^^
John R. Harding
Sr» Vice President

AGREED AND ACCEPTED this
^ *L day of April, 1997.

Mr. DafltSTMelvin

\\5

EXHIBIT C

Release
I, David Melvin, in consideration of the smn of $2,02957 (less any applicable
federal, state, and local taxes and other withholdings) hereby release Franklin Covey Co.
from all liability arising out of its failure to pay me commissions for sales completed
before my termination on September 12,1997. This release becomes effective upon my
receipt of payment in the amount of $2,029.57. For purposes of this release, any
reference to Franlclm Covey Co. also includes all officers and employees of Franklin
Covey Co. as well; as any affiliated companies.
\
Date:

(AxuL

AnaJk* ft* i<m .
David Melvin

\
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MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW
& BEDNAR, LLC
Steven C. Bednar #5660
Candice Anderson #7456
370 East South Temple, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)363-5678
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Attorneys for Plaintiff Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

FRANKLIN COVEY CLIENT SALES,
INC., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,
v.

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
FOR LACK OF PERSONAL
JURISDICTION OR TO CHANGE VENUE

DAVID MELVIN, an individual,
Civil No. 2:98CV00155B
Defendant.

Judge Dee V. Benson

Plaintiff Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. ("Franklin Covey") respectfully submits this
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative to Change
Venue.1
INTRODUCTION
Defendant David Melvin ("Melvin"), a former salesman of Franklin Covey, has moved to
dismiss Franklin Covey's Declaratory Judgment Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. In
the alternative, he asks that this case be transferred to the United States District Court for the
Melvin's Memorandum in Support of his Motion ("Melvin Memo.") contains 17 pages of argument and is
therefore in violation of DUCivR 7-1(b)(3)
Doc. 5081
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District of Maryland where Melvin, three weeks after the filing of this action, filed a
substantially identical lawsuit against Franklin Covey.
Melvin's jurisdictional argument is patently frivolous. Melvin's Declaration2 recites ten
trips to Utah specifically related to his employment. More importantly, Melvinfs draft Complaint
(which prompted this declaratory judgment action) and the Complaint filed by Melvin in
Maryland both allege specific work that Melvin performed in Utah for which he now demands
compensation. Melvin's own pleadings allege direct and specific contact with this forum; and
part of his claim against Franklin Covey "arises out of1 these exact same contacts. This is a
classic case of "arising out of specific jurisdiction. Melvin's argument to avoid personal
jurisdiction is duplicitous and completely at odds with his own pleadings.
Melvin's request to change venue is also ill-founded. Melvin has not contested that venue
is properly laid in this Court (and the time to file any such motion under FRCP 12(b)(3) has
passed). Rather, Melvin requests this action to be transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1404. This
request fails because Melvin has offered no support for his contention that the District of
Maryland is a sufficiently more convenient forum.
Melvin's motions are a disingenuous tactical ploy. This declaratory judgment action was
filed in Utah State Court because Melvin, shortly after settling his claim for commissions and
executing a Release, threatened to sue Franklin Covey again, boasting that the Release (drafted
by his own lawyer) did not bar a claim for post-termination compensation. Melvin's effort to

The "Declaration of David Melvin" submitted in support of Melvin's motion does not comply with the
requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1746 because it does not recite that it is made "under penalty of perjury." 28 U.S.C. §
1746(1). The Court is therefore free to disregard Mr. Melvin's Declaration.
Doc. 5081
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extort Franklin Covey a second time failed. Rather than wait for Melvin to make good on his
threat, Franklin Covey initiated this declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration Franklin
Covey has no obligation to pay post-termination commissions. Melvin first removed this
declaratory judgment action case to this Court. Melvin now asks this Court not to hear the case,
but to transfer it to Maryland. Melvin is attempting to misuse this Court as nothing more than a
weigh station.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Melvin was employed as a Franklin Covey salesman from 1992 until September

12,1997. Exhibit A, Melvin's Maryland Complaint, 11?
2.

Following his termination, Franklin Covey and Melvin disputed the amount of

commissions owed to Melvin. In November 1997, Franklin Covey paid Melvin $2,029.57.
Melvin signed a Release, prepared by Melvin's counsel, releasing Franklin Covey from "all
liability arising out of its failure to pay [Melvin] commissions for sales completed before
[Melvin's] termination on September 12,1997." Exhibit B, Release.
3.

Three months after executing the Release, acting through the same legal counsel,

Melvin made a new demand on and sent a draft Complaint to Franklin Covey demanding
payment of additional commissions for services that might be delivered after the effective date of
his termination. See Exhibit B to Complaint.

Because Melvin has not filed an answer to the allegations of the Declaratory Judgment Complaint, many
of the facts stated in this Memorandum are drawnfromMelvin's Maryland Complaint. Melvin will certainly not
dispute his own allegations.
Doc. 5081
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4.

On February 13,1998, Franklin Covey filed the instant action in the Third

Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah (the "Utah Action").
5.

On March 3,1998, Melvin filed his Maryland Complaint in the United States

District Court for the District of Maryland (Civ. Case No. AW-98-655) ("Maryland Complaint").
Exhibit A.
6.

In his Maryland Complaint, Melvin alleges that:
On one or more occasions, Melvin traveled to Utah to meet
with potential customers of Franklin Covey to help develop
a relationship. In particular, Melvin met with
representatives of GEC-Marconi Hazeltine in Salt Lake
City in May 1997. Melvin's efforts resulted in the
development of a major new customer for Franklin Covey.
Franklin Covey has not compensated Melvin for his efforts
with GEC-Marconi.

Maryland Complaint f 16 (emphasis added).
7.

On March 9, 1998, Melvin filed a Notice of Removal, removing the Utah Action

to this Court.
8.

On April 10, 1998, Franklin Covey filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in the

Utah Action contending that Melvin's quantum meruit claim is absolutely barred by the existence
of Melvin's express compensation agreement, which recites: "commissions are paid only for
those services delivered while you are employed by Franklin."

Doc. 5081
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ARGUMENT
I.

MELVIN IS SUBJECT TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION BECAUSE HE SEEKS
COMPENSATION "ARISING OUT OF" HIS CONTACTS WITH UTAH.
Melvin's Declaration admits ten trips to Utah directly related to his employment. Melvin

Declaration, p. 2. Melvin has filed a pleading alleging that he procured a "major new customer"
for Franklin Covey while in Utah and demanding compensation for his work in Utah. Exhibit A,
Maryland Complaint, f 16. Melvin?s Memorandum and Declaration acknowledge that Melvin
has had significant contacts with Utah. This Court possesses specific personal jurisdiction over
Melvin and Melvin's argument to the contrary is frivolous.
Under Utah law, a three-part inquiry is used to determine whether specific jurisdiction
exists: "(1) the defendant's acts or contacts must satisfy the Utah long-arm statute; (2) a 'nexus1
must exist between the plaintiffs claims and the defendant's acts or contacts; and (3) application
of the Utah long-arm statute must satisfy the requirements of federal due process."
Harnischfeger Engr's, Inc. v. Uniflo Conveyor, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 608, 612 (D. Utah 1995).4
A.

Melvin Has "Transacted Business" Under the Utah Long-Arm Statute.

The Utah long-arm statute is satisfied if Melvin has "transacted] any business within the
state." Utah Code Ann § 78-27-24(a). A person transacts business when he engages in any
activity which "affect persons or businesses within the state of Utah." Utah Code Ann. § 78-2723. This is a "broad definition which invites liberal application." Far West Capital Inc. v.
Towne, 828 F. Supp. 909, 912 (D. Utah 1993), affd, 46 F.3d 1071 (10th Cir. 1995). This Court
4

Melvin's Memorandum argues at length that he is not subject to general jurisdiction. This is not disputed.
Melvin does not have such "continuous and systematic contacts" with this forum such that he could be haled into a
Utah court on matters unrelated to his dealings with Franklin Covey. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia,
S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 (1984).
Doc. 5081
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has interpreted this provision broadly, holding that a defendant need not be present in the state in
order to transact business in Utah, Brown v. Washoe Housing Auth.f 625 F. Supp. 595, 599 (D.
Utah 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 835 F.2d 1327 (10th Cir. 1988). Even a single phone call to
a Utah resident is sufficient to satisfy the "transacting business" threshold because such a call
"affects persons and businesses within the State of Utah." Nova Mud Corp. v. Fletcher, 648 F.
Supp. 1123,1126 (D. Utah 1986).
Melvin "transacted business" in Utah under the long-arm statute. He made ten trips to
Utah to conduct business here, he was an employee of a Utah resident, his direct supervisor was
in Utah during the first year of his employment, and he acknowledges having regularly spoken
with other Franklin Covey employees in Utah. Melvin Memo, at p.2. Melvin's conduct clearly
falls within the broad parameters of the Utah long-arm statute.
B.

There is a "Nexus" Between Melvinfs Contacts With Utah and the Claims
Raised in the Declaratory Judgment Action

The "nexus" requirement is satisfied when a non-resident engages in conduct within the
state and the plaintiffs claims against the defendant "arise from" that conduct. Harnischfeger,
833 F. Supp. at 617-18; see also National Petroleum Marketing, Inc. v. Phoenix Fuel Co., 902 F.
Supp. 1459, 1472-73 (D. Utah 1995). Melvin's own pleadings conclusively establish that this
prong is satisfied.
Melvin's Maryland Complaint and Melvin's Declaration acknowledge that he traveled to
Utah on at lease ten separate occasions and that he transacted business with Franklin Covey
while in Utah. Exhibit A, Maryland Complaint \ 16; Melvin Decl. ^ 6. Melvin further
acknowledges that he corresponded with coworkers in Utah in order make sales in his assigned
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territory. Melvin Memo, at 2. Most significantly, Melvin pleads in his own Maryland
Complaint that
On one or more occasions, Melvin traveled to Utah to meet with
potential customers of Franklin Covey to help develop a
relationship. In particular, Melvin met with representatives of
GEC-Marconi Hazeltine in Salt Lake City in May 1997. Melvin's
efforts resulted in the development of a major new customer for
Franklin. Franklin has not compensated Melvin for his efforts with
GEC-Marconi Hazeltine.
Exhibit A, Maryland Complaint, 1fl[ 20,24-27. Melvin seeks compensation for work performed
in Utah. Melvin's quantum meruit claim has a direct, immediate, and inescapable nexus to his
contacts with Utah.
C.

This Court's Exercise of Jui isdiction < miiporls nilli (li« Requirements \nl
Federal Due Process

Due process is satisfied when an individual has "fair warning that a particular activity
may subject him to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign." Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,
218 (1977). This requirement is satisfied when, as here, "the defendant has purposefully directed
his activities at residents of the forum and litigation results from alleged injuries that 'arise out of
or relate to' these activities." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985). Due
process mandates consideration of "(1) whether the cause of action arises out of or has a
substantial connection with the activity; (2) the balance of the convenience of the parties and the
interest of the State in assuming jurisdiction; and (3) the character of the defendant's activities
within the State." TedR. Brown & Assoc, v. Carnes Corp., 611 P.2d 378, 380 (Utah 1980).
Melvin cannot have it both ways. He alleges in his Maryland Complaint that he came to
Utah "on one or more occasions" to help develop a relationship with existing or potential clients.
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He now asks the Court to take seriously his argument that he "transacted no business in Utah."
Melvin Memo, at 4. Melvin is asserting a claim against Franklin Covey that derives directly
from his contacts with this forum. He came here to conduct business, he conducted business, and
now he demands payment for what he did here. That is "purposeful availment." Melvin simply
cannot say that he has not had "fair warning" that he would be haled before a Utah court for
matters related to the work he alleges he performed here.

II.

THERE IS NO BASIS FOR THIS COURT TO DECLINE RULING ON
FRANKLIN COVEY'S DECLARATORY JUDGMENT CLAIM
Melvin asks this Court to exercise its discretion not to render a declaratory judgment on

the basis that (1) any ruling by this Court will not be fully dispositive; and (2) Franklin Covey is
not in need of immediate relief, but has simply raced Melvin to the courthouse to inflict hardship
on Melvin.5 Neither of these arguments has merit.
A.

This Declaratory Judgment Action is Fully Dispositive

Melvin contends this action may not be fully dispositive because if the Court finds that
Melvin is entitled to post-termination commissions then the parties will have to litigate the issue
of damages in some other court. This argument is frivolous. Any claim Melvin may have for
damages "arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of [Franklin
Covey's] claim" and is therefore a compulsory counterclaim which Melvin must either raise in

5

Melvin's argument mistakenly assumes that the discretion extant under the federal declaratory judgment
statute (28 U.S.C. § 2201) applies to this case. In fact, this action was brought under the Utah Declaratory Judgment
Act, which restricts discretion to deny the relief requested only when the judgment "would not terminate the
uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding." Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-6. Because this is a diversity
case, the Court is required to apply state substantively law. If the federal declaratory judgment statute affords
broader discretion to deny relief than the state statute, then the state statute must be applied.
Doc. 5081

4

this action or forfeit. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a). Mr. Melvin's assertion that the "matter would go
forward in Maryland" (Memo. p. 9) is also dead wrong because issues folly and fairly litigated
here are subject to collateral estoppel in the Maryland Action. Because this case is folly
dispositive of the controversy, there is no basis for this Court to refuse to hear the action.
B.

Franklin is In Immnliate Mcni of Declaiaton RHief

Melvin contends that Franklin does not need declaratory relief "to avoid accrual of
damages," but has simply filed this action in Utah to inflict hardship on Melvin. Melvin fails to
recognize that Franklin Covey must know immediately to whom commissions should be paid.
Melvin also mischaracterizes his "race to the courthouse" allegations to make himself appear
sympathetic.
Citing Great American Ins. v. Houston General, 735 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y 1990),
Melvin contends that this case defies the purpose of declaratory relief because Franklin Covey is
not in a position of having to "avoid accrual of avoidable damages" based on uncertainty of its
rights. This is wrong. Melvin lays claim to post-termination commissions. Under Franklin
Covey's policy, the commissions Melvin seeks are paid to current employees. If Melvin were
found to be entitled to those same commissions, Franklin Covey would be in a position of having
to pay the same commission twice, once to a current and once to a former employee. Holding
commissions in abeyance or risking double payment involves the accrual of "avoidable
damages." Franklin has a significant interest in resolving this dispute immediately.
Melvin's "race to the courthouse" argument fares no better. Melvin contends that
Franklin Covey learned of Melvin's claims through amicable correspondence from his counsel
and then quickly filed a declaratory judgment action in Utah so as to inflict hardship on Melvin.
Doc. 5081
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Melvin attempts to analogize this case to Great American Ins. Co. v. Houston General Ins. Co.,
735 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). Melvin's argument is factually misleading and legally
meritless.
In Great American, the declaratory judgment plaintiff, Great American, had received a
letter from the defendant, Houston General, threatening Great American with suit if it did not
make payment of an amount allegedly due to Houston. Great American responded by
acknowledging some limited liability and seeking a 60-day extension within which to evaluate its
claims. Two days later, Great American filed a declaratory judgment action against Houston
General and then sought and obtained a temporary restraining order prohibiting Houston General
from filing its suit against Great American.6 Id. at 583. The district court held that Great
American's deceitful and manipulative tactic warranted dismissal of the declaratory judgment
action. Id. at 586.
This case bears no similarity to Great American. Franklin Covey did nothing to mislead
Melvin or to interfere with his ability to file his lawsuit in Maryland. Franklin Covey made no
representations to Melvin to cause him to sit on his rights. Two forums were available in which
to file and Franklin Covey chose Utah while Melvin chose Maryland. There is nothing sinister
or improper about Franklin Covey's decision to file this declaratory judgment action and to select
Utah as its forum.

\jpon expiration of the TRO, the district court refused to enter a preliminary injunction against Houston
General. Subsequently, Houston General filed its own coercive action against Great American and moved that
Great American's declaratory judgment be dismissed or transferred and consolidated. Great American, 735 F. Supp.
at 583.
Doc. 5081
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The history of this dispute also sets this case apart from Great American and explains
Franklin Covey's desire to bring about quick resolution of the case. Melvin's counsel threatened
suit against Franklin Covey once before, contending that Franklin Covey had shorted Melvin on
pre-termination commissions. Franklin Covey denied liability but made a cash payment to
Melvin and Melvin executed a "Release," prepared by his counsel. rhen, a mere three months
after "settling" with Franklin Covey, Melvin and his counsel returned again to the well, making
new demands upon Franklin Covey, now seeking payment in excess of $600,000 (in
contravention Melvinfs express compensation agreement) for post-termination commissions.
Franklin Covey's response was one of incredulity, having been blind sided by Melvin and his
counsel after good faith negotiations and settlement. Rather than wait for Melvin to make good
on his new extortive threat, Franklin Covey responded with the filing of this declaratory
judgment action.7

HI.

THIS CASE SHOULD NOT BE TRANSFERRED TO MARYLAND
Without contesting the propriety of venue, Melvin asks this Court to ignore Franklin

Covey's legitimate choice of forum and transfer this case to Maryland. In support of this
argument, Melvin submits an invalid and unsworn declaration which offers only conclusory
assertions.

During the negotiations leading up to the November 13 settlement, Melvin did not at any time suggest to
Franklin Covey that, notwithstanding Franklin Covey policy to the contrary, he believed that he was entitled to
commissions on sales made after he was terminated. If, as Melvin now claims, he has acted in good faith and
attempted to resolve this matter "short of litigation," the logical question remains why he did not raise the instant
claims in the context of the prior settlement negotiations and why he chose instead to remain silent until after
receiving payment from Franklin Covey.
Doc. 5081

7

A party seeking transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) bears the burden of proving that the
forum is sufficiently inconvenient. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d
1509,1515 (10th Cir. 1991). Among the factors to be considered by the Court in ruling on the
motion are:
the plaintiffs choice of forum; the accessability of witnesses and
other sources of proof, including the availability of compulsory
process to insure attendance of witnesses; the cost of making the
necessary proof; questions as to the enforceability of a judgment if
one is obtained; relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial;
difficulties that may arise from congested dockets; the possibility
of the existence of questions arising in the area of conflict of laws;
the advantage of having a local court determine questions of local
law; and all other considerations of a practical nature that make a
trial easy, expeditious and economical.
Id. at 1516. "Unless the balance is strongly in favor of the movant, the plaintiffs choice of
forum should rarely be disturbed." William A. Smith Contracting Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co.,
467 F.2d 662, 664 (10th Cir. 1972) (emphasis added).
In Scheldt v. Klein, 956 F.2d 963 (10th Cir. 1992), the Tenth Circuit rejected precisely the
same arguments being raised in this case by Melvin. In arguing for transfer from Oklahoma to
Florida, the defendant in Scheidt claimed that (1) the majority of the witnesses were in Florida,
(2) the pertinent documentary evidence was in Florida, and (3) the conduct at issue occurred in
Florida and would be evaluated under Florida law. Id. at 965. Like Melvin, the defendant in
Scheidt submitted a conclusory affidavit in support of his motion. The Tenth Circuit upheld
denial of the motion to transfer, holding that the defendant's "meager showing" failed to
demonstrate the degree of inconvenience necessary to transfer an action and that the applicability
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of Florida law did not present a ground for transfer due to the relatively simple claims asserted.
Id. \ it 965-66 8
In this case, Melvin makes the exact same arguments as the defendant in Scheldt and his
arguments fa

the exact same reasons I ike the defendant in Scheldt, Melvin makes no effort

to identify who he intends to call as witnesses at trial-he merely makes conclusory assertions
regarding "categories" of witnesses who might be called at trial. Melvin Decl. f 9. Melvin does
not provide any information regarding what these \ inidentified witnesses Hill H'stify to »»r why
their testimony might be material. Melvin presents no explanation as to why the deposition
testimon.) of these unknot n witnesses (which would be obtained w ithin 100 miles from 'their
home, Fed R. Civ. P. 45(b)(2)) could not be used at trial. Melvin states in his Memorandum that
Maryland is the preferred forum because of the "availability for compulsory process," Melvin
Memo, at 14. \ et, only ten of the 65 listed "former clients" coi lid be compelled to attei id a trial
in Maryland because they presumably reside outside of Maryland.9 See Melvin Decl. f 9(c).
Melvin makes no effor t to show that compulsory process would be necessary in any event. ' I o

Specifically, the Court noted that although the defendant stated in his affidavit that he would call a number
of Florida witnesses in support of his case, he offered nothing to indicate "the quality or materiality of the testimony
of said witnesses;" he offered nothing to show that the witnesses would not voluntarily come to Oklahoma for trial,
that deposition testimony would nor be sufficient, or that the use of compulsory process would be necessary. Id.
The court further rejected the defendant's conclusory statement that "boxes of documents" would have to be
produced in support of the defense because the defendant never explained why the documents could not be sifted
through and the relevant documents shipped to Oklahoma. Id. at 966.
9

As the court put it in Greenberg v. Greenberg, 954 F. Supp. 213 (D. Colo. 1997) when faced with an
identical claim by the defendant, "whether the trial is held in Colorado or Michigan, certain witnesses will not be
subject to the subpoena power of the court and some witnesses and documents will have to be transported. Transfer
of civil actions is not favored where the transfer would serve only to shift the burden of inconvenience from one
party to another." Id at 217.
Doc. 5081
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the contrary, Melvin states that these unidentified witnesses hold him in such "high regard" that
then uoulilbf willnu1 to travel and testify mi his behalf Mv\ 'in Memo .it 16.
Regarding the locus of evidence, Melvin claims that "[mjost of the sources of proof are in
Maryland," but he provides no indication as to what that proof is and why it could not be
presented in Utah.10 Without any analysis of the conflict of laws question, Melvin categorically
states that "Maryalnd [sic] law will govern the issue of whether or not the defendant's employer

explanation as to why this Court is not just as competent to examine a simple quantum meruit
claim as a federal judge sitting in Maryland.
Finally, Melvin has also overlooked another basic defect in his transfer argument.
Witnesses will testify, depositions will be taken, and documentary evidence will be presented at
trial- be it in 'fs Ian, land or I Itah only if there is a trial Fi anklin C D\ e> has filed a full)
dispositive Motion for Summary Judgment which demonstrates unequivocally that Melvin's
claims are frivolous. This Court is perfectly competent to rule on Franklin Covey's Summary
Judgment Motion and nothing will be gained by transferring this case only to have the case
delayed, unnecessary resources expended and then summarily dismissed in Maryland. This case
has progressed far beyond the Maryland ^ ction. "While a sum n lary judgment motion is pending
in this case, a responsive pleading is not due in the Maryland Action for another several weeks.

10

Melvin states that some files are electronic data files that could be accessed "from any computer with a
modem." Melvin Decl. f 11. Hence, according to Melvin's own analysis, these files would be as readily accessible
from Utah as from Maryland.
Doc. 5081
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CONCLUSION
Foi thf forey,oiii(L» reasons,, MHvin's Motion It) Dismiss tor 1 ack ol Personal Jurisdiction
or in the Alternative to Change Venue should be denied.
D/YIFDtlns, I Mi day of April, IW8
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW
& BEDNAR, LLC

Steven C. Bednar
Candice Anderson
Attorneys for Plaintiff Franklin Covey Client
Sales, Inc.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be served in the
method indicated below to the below named parties this 13th of April 1998.
HAND DELIVERY
^ U . S . MAIL
OVERNIGHT MAIL
FAX TRANSMISSION

David Melvin
812 Whittington Terrace
Silver Spring, MD 20901

HAND DELI V I-KV
_s/U.S. MAIL
OVERNIGHT MAIL
FAX TRANSMISSION

MarkL. Ht:shd, l-sq.
Suite 307
11501 Georgia Avenue
Wheaton, MD 20902
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Attorneys for Plaintiff Franklin Covey
Client Sales, Inc.
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

FRANKLIN COVEY CLIENT SALES,
INC., a Utah corporation,

v.

]
]
)
;)
I
]

DAVID MELVIN, an individual,

]|

Civil No. 980901616 MI

)1

Judge David S. Young

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

REPLY MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Pursuant to Rule 4-501(l)(c) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Plaintiff
Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. ("Franklin") respectfully submits this Reply Memorandum in
Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment in this Declaratory Judgment Action against David
Melvin ("Melvin").
NQ MATERIAL F ACI& AREIN

DISPUTE

Franklin's principal memorandum sets out four undisputed facts which require this
Declaratory Judgment Action to be decided as a matter of law. Other than professing confusion

"MS

as to whether Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. or Franklin Covey Co. was his employer, Melvin
does not, and cannot, contest these four facts. Melvin's Opposition i\ lemorandun 1 '"places all of
its eggs in one basket," hoping that an artificially created ambiguity about the identity of his
employer may somehow create a genuine issue of material fact. Unfortunately for Melvin, the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure make a strawman of his desperate strategy.
This Court is presented with a straightforward legal question: Can Melvin assert a claim

Agreement forbids it? The answer to this question is the same whether Melvin was employed
by Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. or Franklin Covey Co. Either way, there is only one
employment relationship, one employer, one employee and one relevant agreement. Melvin's
self-serving confusion fails to create a question of material fact because the Rules of Civil

either for itself, or on behalf of its parent, Franklin Covey Co. Moreover, to the extent necessary
(if at all), Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. has received an assignment from Franklin Covey Co.
of any rights necessary to prosecute this action and Franklin Covey Co. has agreed to be bound
by any judgment issued by the Court. Melvin cannot escape the substance of this suit by playing
"name games."

2

-ZSfo

ARGUMENT
I.

MELVIN HAS FAILED TO CREATE A GENUINE ISSUE WITH RESPECT TO
ANY MATERIAL FACT.
A.

Melvin's Confusion About the Identity of His Employer is Irrelevant Because
This Action is Binding Against Both Franklin Covey Client Sales. Inc. and
Franklin Covey Co.

Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Franklin Covey Co.
(formerly Franklin Quest Company). N tel/v in's act tial en iplo> er was Franklin Cove)- Client Sales,
Inc. This fact is established by reference to Melvin's IRS form W-2 for tax year 1997. See
Exhibit A. Melvin attempts to evade the substance of this action by asserting that Franklin
Covey Co. was his employei and that Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc therefore lacks standing
to enforce his compensation Agreement. Melvin's gamesmanship is useless for two reasons.
First, , R ule 1 7 of the I Jtah Rules of Civil Pi ocedure expressly piin • ide

s

-.-. t) * ith

whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another... may sue in that
person's name without joining the party for whose benefit the action is brought." U.R.C.P. 17(a)
(emphasis added). I litis, e v en if this action redou •

»the benefit of Franklin Cm ey Co ,

Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. is permitted to sue in its own name without joining Franklin
Co\ e> Co.
Second, to the extent necessary (if at all) Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. has received
an assignment from Franklin Covey Co of "any rights which may be necessary to entitle
Plaintiff to prosecute this action as the real party-in-interest." See Exhibit B. Further, Franklin
Covey Co. has consented to be "bound by the judgment entered in this action to the same extent

3
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as Plaintiff...." Id. Thus, Rule 17fs purpose of ensuring that the "defendant will be permitted
^ -cv i] iefenses or ecu u iterclain is a v ailable against 1:1 le real ow i ler of the cause" is clearly
satisfied. Shaw v. Jeppson, 239 P.2d 745, 748 (Utah 1952).
Most importantly, Melvin's technical gaming fails to evade an inescapable point: there
was only one employment relationship, the terms of that relationship are established by an
undisputed compensation Agreement, the rights of Franklin (whether Franklin Covey Co. or
F ran klin Cov ey Client Sales, Inc ) and N leh in are established b> that \greement, a i ici Melvin is
seeking to obtain quasi-contract recovery on a claim precluded by the Agreement. Melvin cannot
avoid the judicial determination required by the undisputed facts by professing convenient
confusion as to whether he was employed by the parent or the subsidiary.
B.

Mglvin Has Not Satisfied the Rule $$ Standard Tp Create Any Genuine Question
of Material Fact.

After exhausting its energy on the irrelevant entity issue, Melvin's Opposition
Memorandum offers a few disconnected stabs at creating some question of fact. Melvin

but not products. Yet, Melvin has admitted in his Maryland Complaint that Franklin's policy and
practice was to not pay commissions "until Franklin actually delivered the product or service."
Melvin's Md. Complaint, f 8, Exhibit A to Franklin's Principal Memo (emphasis added).1

Melvin also seems to suggest that there is some additional agreement that may relate to his employment.
Melvin's Opp. Memo. p. 5. Yet, Melvin has not attached or made part of the record any other agreement. Such an
unsupported contention fails to satisfy the Rule 56(e) standard to create a genuine issue of material fact. U.R C.P.
56(e) (a "party may not rest upon the mere allegations . . . of his pleadings , . . . " ) .
.

•

!

"XAfr

Melvin also contends that his termination may have been based on age discrimination and
references the fact that he has filed «: si- *-•'-* - .

•

•

i. \ \:i H

%

^p.

hopelessly irrelevant. Age discrimination offers its own federal statutory remedy. If Melvin can
prove age discrimination before the EEOC, his damages in that proceeding will include lost
commissions, as allowed by his compensation Agreement. This action requires a
determination of what the compensation Agreement allows. Melvin's claim that his
*mploymei it wa s terminated because of his age is a complete^ unrelated proceeding and has no
impact on whether the Agreement at issue in this suit bars Melvin's quantum meruit claim.
As a final argument, Melvin invites the Court to inquire into potentially divergent
understandings of the parties in order to determine the meaning of the compensation Agreement.
This argument suffers immediate death from the fundamental rule that parol evidence cannot be

1062 (Utah 1981) ("It is only when an ambiguity exists which cannot be reconciled by an
objective and reasonable interpretation of the contract as a whole that resort may be had to the
use of extrinsic evidence."). Melvin's compensation Agreement provides: "According to
Franklin policy, commissions are paid only for those services delivered while you are
employed by Franklin " This is not ambiguous.'"

2

Rule 56 requires Melvin to do more than "rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings" in
order to create a genuine issue of material fact. U.R.C.P. 56(e). Melvin has submitted only an inadmissible
Declaration, which fails to address any relevant fact. Moreover, Melvin's Declaration is unsworn, unnotarized and
inadmissible.

5

CONCLUSION
As a matter of law, Franklin is entitled to a declaration that it has no obligation to pay
Melvin compensation or com missions for sales after the termination of his employment.
Franklin therefore requests that the Court enter the declaratory relief requested in the Complaint.
DATED this Y _ day of June 1998
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW & BEDNAR, LLC

Steven C. Bednar
Candice Anderson
Attorneys For Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc.
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CERTIFICATE; OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing REPLY
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be mailed,
postage prepaid this ^^
day of June, 1998 to the following:
Mark L. Hessel, Esq.
Suite 307
11501 Georgia Avenue
Wheaton, MD 20902
David Melvin
812 Whittington Terrace
Silver Spring, Maryland 20901
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EXHIBIT B

MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW
& BEDNAR, LLC
Steven C. Bednar #5660
Candice Anderson #7456
370 East South Temple, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-5678
Attorneys for Plaintiff Franklin Covey
Client Sales, Inc.
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

FRANKLIN COVEY CLIENT SALES,
INC., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,
v.

\
])
)
])

FRANKLIN COVEY CO.
CONSENT TO BE BOUND BY
JUDGMENT AND ASSIGNMENT

J

DAVID MELVIN, an individual,
Defendant.

;

i

]i

Civil No. 980901616 MI
Judge David S. Young

Plaintiff Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. ("Plaintiff*) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Franklin Covey Co. Defendant David Melvin ("Defendant") contends that Franklin Covey Co.,
rather than Plaintiff, was his employer and is thus the real party-in-interest in this action.
Franklin Covey Co. hereby asserts that Plaintiff was, in fact, Defendant's employer during the
relevant time period and that Plaintiff is the real party-in-interest in this action. Nevertheless,
Franklin Covey Co. hereby consents to be bound by the Judgment entered in this action to the
same extent as Plaintiff, including any counterclaims which may be asserted by Defendant.

Further, Franklin Covey Co. hereby acknowledges an assignment to Plaintiff of any rights which
may be necessary (if any) to entitle Plaintiff to prosecute this action as the real-party-in-interest.
DATED this 3 _ day of June 1998.
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW & BEDNAR, LLC

Steven C. Bednar
Candice Anderson
Attorneys For Franklin Covey Co.

"jctt

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing FRANKLIN COVEY
CO. CONSENT TO BE BOUND BY JUDGMENT AND ASSIGNMENT to be mailed, postage
prepaid this 7 ^ day of June, 1998 to the following:
Mark L. Hessel, Esq.
Suite 307
11501 Georgia Avenue
Wheaton, MD 20902
David Melvin
812 Whittington Terrace
Silver Spring, Maryland 20901
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MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW
& BEDNAR, LLC
Steven C. Bednar #5660
Candice Anderson #7456
370 East South Temple, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-5678
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Attorneys for Plaintiff Franklin Covey
Client Sales, Inc.
t**itram~
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

FRANKLIN COVEY CLIENT SALES,
INC., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

DAVID MELVIN, an individual,
Defendant.

ORDER

Civil No. 980901616 MI
Judge David S. Young

Defendant David Melvin's Motion(s) to Dismiss and Plaintiff Franklin Covey Client
Sales, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment came before the Court on July 26,1998. Steven C.
Bednar appeared on behalf of Plaintiff Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. and on behalf of
Franklin Covey Co.1 Defendant David Melvin did not appear at the hearing. The Court

Franklin Covey Co. is not a named party to this action but has previously filed a pleading entitled Consent
to Be Bound By Judgment and Assignment.
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announced the rulings set forth in this Order based upon the Memoranda submitted by the parties
and without oral argument.
The Court, having read briefs and memoranda submitted by the parties and the
accompanying attachments and having considered the relevant authorities, hereby orders as
follows: Defendant's Motion(s) to Dismiss are hereby DENIED.2 With respect to Plaintiff
Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment, there are no genuine issues
of material fact and Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment is therefore GRANTED.

David Melvin

2

Defendant David Melvin filed a Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative to Change Venue while this
action was pending in the United States District Court for the District of Utah. Defendant also filed a Motion to
Dismiss after remand to this Court. Both Motions assert a lack of personal jurisdiction which the Court finds
unmeritorious. The Alterative Motion to Transfer Venue raised in Defendant's First Motion to Dismiss became
moot upon remand. Other arguments raised in Defendant's Motion(s) to Dismiss are subsumed in this Court's
ruling on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment.
#6793
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MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW
& BEDNAR, LLC
Steven C. Bednar #5660
Candice Anderson #7456
370 East South Temple, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-5678
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Deputy Clerk

Attorneys for Plaintiff Franklin Covey
Client Sales, Inc.
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

FRANKLIN COVEY CLIENT SALES,
INC., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

)
)

DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT

v.

)

DAVID MELVIN, an individual,

)

Civil No. 980901616 MI

)

Judge David S. Young

Defendant.

The Court hereby enters judgment in this Declaratory Judgment Action as follows:
1.

Plaintiff Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. is a "person interested" under the Utah

Declaratory Judgment Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 et seq. Plaintiff is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Franklin Covey Co. Franklin Covey Co. has consented to be bound by the
Judgment filed in this action to the same extent as Plaintiff. This Declaratory Judgment is
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therefore binding upon both Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. and Franklin Covey Co.
(hereinafter "Franklin Covey.")1
2.

The Court hereby declares the rights, status, legal relations and obligations of

Franklin Covey and Defendant Melvin arising from Defendant Melvin's employment with
Franklin Covey as follows: (1) Franklin Covey has no contractual, implied or other obligation to
pay Defendant Melvin commissions or any other compensation related to seminars held or future
seminars scheduled to be held or products sold subsequent to the September 12, 1997 effective
date of Defendant Melvin's separation from Franklin Covey; (2) the Release signed by Defendant
Melvin on November 13,1997 bars all claims related to payment of compensation or
commissions for services performed by Melvin during his employment with Franklin; and (3)
Franklin's policy and practice with respect to the payment of commissions to separated Account
Executives is not violative of law.2
3.

The parties shall each bear their own costs and attorneys' fees in this action.

The Court acknowledges that Defendant Melvin contends that his actual employer was Franklin Covey
Co. and not Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. However, the Courtfindsthat it is immaterial whether Defendant
Melvin was employed by Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. or Franklin Covey Co. This action concerns only one
employee, one employer, and only one employment relationship. The relevant terms of Defendant Melvin's
employment relationship are established by an undisputed compensation agreement under which the rights, status,
and legal relations of the parties are hereby determined.
2

The Court finds that the declaratory relief furnished herein is required under both Utah and Maryland
law. The Court is therefore not required to determine which law applies to this dispute.
#6794
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APPROVED AS TO FORM:

David Melvin
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
V
STATE OF UTAH
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Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc.,
Plaintiff,
Civil Case No. 980901616MI
Judge David S. Young

v.
David Melvin,
Defendant.

NOTICE OF APPEAL
David Melvin, the appellant, notes his appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals in the above
entitled matter granting of Declaratory Judgment in favor the appellant, Franklin Covey
Client Sales, Inc. by the Third Judicial District Court In and For Salt Lake County on July
27, 1998.

Date: August 28, 1998

(jia^_.
David Melvlii
812 Whittington Terrace
Silver Spring, Maryland 20901
Defendant, pro se

M^M

Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that on August 29, 1998,1 served a copy of the foregoing Notice of
Appeal on counsel for the appellee, Steven Bednar 370 East South Temple, Suite 200,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 byfirstclass mail, postage prepaid as well as by fax.
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DavidMelvin
812 Whittington Terrace
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc.
Plaintiff,
Civil Case No. 980901616MI
Judge David S. Young

v.
David Melvin,
Defendant.

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR ORDER
The pro se defendant, David Melvin, respectfully moves this Court for an Order to Modify and/or
Amend its Declaratory Judgment Order signed July 27,1998 and the underlying Summary Judgment
Order that supported it signed July 14,1998 pursuant to Rule 60 (b) (1) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure (herein U.R.C.P.) and to vacate both Orders and for reasons states as follows: The Orders
referred to in this motion were filed on July 14,1998 and July 27,1998 respectively This is motion is
being filed on October , 1998 and is therefore timely pursuant to Rule 60 (b) U.R. C. P.
1. Errors of Law.
a. The Court's findings of fact are insufficient to support its conclusions of law. The
declarations adjudged by the Court in the Declaratory Judgment Order are beyond the
scope of the facts found by the Court in the Summary Judgment Order, are not supported
by the record, and must be withdrawn.
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b. The Court erred as a matter of law by extending its Order to the state of Maryland in that
Maryland law was never briefed nor presented to the Court and the factual findings in the
Summary Judgment Order do not support a finding that the Declaratory Judgment is
"required under both Utah and Maryland law."
C. The Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff, Franklin Covey Client
Sales, Inc. (herein FCCS) did not have authority to sue as it was not the real party in
interest as required by Rule 17 U.R.C. P.
d. This Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because it failed to enforce Section 78-33-2
requiring that the plaintiff be a party "interested" or affected by a written contract and
Section of the Utah Code, and 78-33-11 of the Utah Code requiring that when declaratory
relief be sought by all persons claiming any interest which would be affected by the
declaration, and without said necessary party this Court's ruling will not end the
controversy.
e.

The Court erred in failing to find that it had personal jurisdiction over the defendant before
entering its judgment in this case.

f.

The Court erred in deciding the Summary Judgment motion prior to allowing the defendant
time for discovery.

g. The Court erred in not excluding the "Consent to be Bound By Judgment and Assignment,"
a document clearly lacking in probative value for which there exists no support in Utah
practice or law and further erred by basing its Declaratory Judgment Order substantially
upon this dubious document which was of questionable probative value but clearly highly
prejudicial.
h. The Court erred in the legal standard it applied to the document signed by the defendant on
April 9,1998.

SOI

i.

The Court erred in the legal standard it applied to the document signed by the defendant on
November 13,1998.

j.
2.

The Court erred by failing to address the defendant's unjust enrichment claim.

Errors of Fact.
a.

The Court erred in entering a Declaratory Judgment Order that is unsupported by the
Court's findings of fact in its Summary Judgment Order and is so lacking in support that it
is against the weight of the evidence before the Court.

b. The Court erred infindingthat as a matter of law there were no uncontested material facts
when genuine issues of fact existed on the record.
c.

The Court erred infindingthere this action "concerns one employee, one employer and one
employment relationship" as there are no facts in the record to support this conclusion.

d. The Court erred infindingthat the April 9,1998 document was "an undisputed
compensation agreement," as there was no evidence in the record to support this
conclusion.
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David Melvin
812 Whittington Terrace
Silver Spring, Maryland 20901
(301) 593-3364 FAX (301) 593-2987
Defendant, pro se
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

i
Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc.

i

Plaintiff,
Civil Case No. 980901616MI
Judge David S. Young

v.
David Melvin,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM
JUDGMENT OR ORDER
Pursuant to Rule 4-501(l)(a) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Defendant, pro se, David
Melvin respectfully submits this memorandum in support of his Motion for Relieffromthis Court's July
14,1998 and July 27,1998 Orders.
ERRORS OF LAW.
In its Summary Judgment Order the Court found the following: "The Defendant's Motion(s) to
Dismiss are hereby DENIED." (The only supporting item was a footnote in which the Court stated it
found both Motion asserting lack of personal jurisdiction unmeritorious.) (emphasis added) and "There
are no genuine issues of material fact and Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." There
were no further findings. Yet in its Declaratory Judgment Order the Court declared the following: "(1)
Franklin Covey has no contractual, implied or other obligation to pay Defendant Meivin commissions or
any other compensation related to seminars held or future seminars scheduled to be held or products
sold subsequent to the September 12,1997 effective date of Defendant Melvin's separation from

Stfo

Franklin Covey; (2) the Release signed by Defendant Melvin on November 13,1997 bars all claims
related to payment of compensation or commissions for services performed by Melvin during his
employment with Franklin; and (3) Franklin's policy and practice with respect to the payment of
commissions to separated Account Executives is not violative of law." In a footnote, the Court held
found that the "declaratory relief herein is required under both Utah and Maryland law. The Court is
therefore not required to determine which law applies to this dispute." While admittedly giving the
plaintiff all the relief it could dream of and more, unfortunately, the Court failed to consider the record
before it and whether or not its findings were support by it. In fact, the Court committed several errors
of law. "Rule 60(b)(1) provides a trial court may relieve a party of a judgment in a case o f . . . mistake
of law by the trial court." Bischel v. Merritt, 278 UAR 29,30 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
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ARGUMENT
1. The findings of fact set forth in the Summary Judgment Order are insufficient to support the
declarations and relief granted in the Declaratory Judgment Order. "It has long been the law in this
state that conclusions of law must be predicated upon and find support in thefindingsof fact."
Gillmor v. Wright, 209 UAR 6,9 (Utah 1993) citing cases back to 1917. "Without adequate
findings of fact, there can be no meaningful appellate review," Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 547,
551, 555 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Willey v. Willey, 914 P.2d 1149,1151 (Utah Ct. App. 1996);
Willey v. Willey, 333 UAR 8,10 (Utah, 1997) and an appellate court is forced to remand an action
to the trial court (on occasion, several times) in order to obtain adequate findings to review. This is
wasteful of judicial resources and places an unfair burden on the party forced to continually apply
to the appellate courts for relief. "To allow the trial court to impose speculation on the adjudicatory
process violates the basic premise upon our judicial system is founded. All parties are absolutely
entitled to a fair and impartial hearing and adjudication of their affairs," Willey v. Willey, 287
UAR 27,28 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) which was so clearly lacking in this case.
2.

Except for one Maryland case cited by the plaintiff in its original Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment, which dealt with a general legal principle regarding contract
interpretation, under a legal theory that was disputed by the defendant, neither side briefed nor
presented any arguments to this Court citing Maryland law. While the Declaratory Judgment
statement making this Court's Order applicable under Maryland law (and thus presumably
attempting to foreclose future action in the Maryland courts), may demonstrate the value of Rule
5(b)(2) U.R.C.P. to a prevailing party (particularly one in a sympathetic forum), this alone cannot
possibly justify the overreaching that this declaration demonstrates. The defendant challenges the
plaintiff to show to the Court and the defendant anything in the record before the Court which
would have permitted the Court to legitimately make this declaration.

1
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3.

The Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and, therefore, should have dismissed this case
pursuant to Rule 17 U.RC.P. which states, "every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest." In the instant case, the real party at interest was the company with whom the
Defendant had an employment relationship and who owed the Defendant certain obligations and
responsibilities, and whose name as evidenced by all of the documentation presented to this Court
(which was multitudinous and will not be repeated here) was Franklin Covey Co. not FCCS.
"Rule 17 seeks to protect the interests of judicial economy and fairness to parties in a
litigation", (emphasis added). Anderson v. Dean Whitter Reynolds, Inc., 200 UAR 65, 66 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992)1 It should be noted that the plaintiff, FCCS, chose both the forum and the parties.
When its privity to the defendant and thus, its standing to sue were questioned, it originally
attempted to ignore the issue by obfuscation2 and finally provided a document which is notable for
its originality, but would likely fail in the purposes for which it was offered in most courts and
jurisdictions. While Rule 17 does recognize some exceptions listed below in order to forestall
further irrelevant arguments by the plaintiff, none are applicable in the instant case:
a.

Rule 17 defines those that fall within its scope to include: "a party with whom or in whose
name a contract has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute
[to] sue in that person's name without joining the party for whose bene fit that action is
brought/9 The rule contemplates that the party bringing the suit has the capacity to sue on
behalf of the real party in interest such as an executor, guardian, etc. Thus Rule 17

1
Anderson goes on to explain that the purpose of Rule 17 is to protect the defendant from multiple lawsuits
on the same facts by several plaintiffs. While the plaintiff in the instant case could claim mat its spurious
document entitled "Consent to be Bound" provides the defendant with this protection it really doesn't The
clear intent of both Rule 17 and Anderson and other case cited herein is for the real parties in interest to the
dispute to have their case brought forward on the merits and tried before an impartial firider of fact and law.
The clear intent of the plaintiffs "Consent to be Bound" is to undermine that process, .ht best it provides
protection solely for the plaintiff and (and the mysteriously absent Franklin Covey Co.) in the instant case, and
none to the defendant At wont it protects neither party. Its validity and probative value are addressed in
detail later in this document and will not be rehashed in this footnote. However, given lfr dubious merit as a
pleading it is highly doubtful mat another Court in another jurisdiction would give it any consideration at all
or either allow it into evidence.
2
Deliberately mixing up the names of the two companies through misquotation and the artful use of
nomenclature.

2
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contemplates 3 party beneficiary suits when the plaintiff has privity with the contracting
parties and was an intended beneficiary of any contracts alleged." American Towers
Owners Assoc, Inc. v. C.C. Mechanical Inc., 306 UAR 3, 5 (Utah 1996). In addition to
the lack of privity that exists between the Defendant and FCCS, a review of the April 9,
1997 letter (which plaintiff so assiduously attaches to all its pleadings) clearly shows it
was never mentioned. "The intent of the contracting parties to confer a separate and
distinct benefit must be clear." American Towers at page 6. There is r^o evidence before
this Court that would permit it to determine that FCCS could act on behalf of Franklin
Covey Co. In its reply memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, plaintiff cites this
Court to only part of Rule 17, which it then proceeds to interpret in a completely novel
way, while ignoring (and asking this Court to accept this sleight of hand) the clear wording
of Rule 17, regarding when a court can properly recognize 3rd party beneficiary status, and
the long line of case law that has interpreted Rule 17 and under which plaintiff's claim
would be dismissed. See American Towers, supra; Estate of Martin Haro v. Haro, 254
UAR 19,20 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Broadwater v. Old Republic Surety, 854 P. 2d 527,
537 (Utah 1993) and the long line of cases cited therein,
b.

In the normal course of events, this Court could now allow the plaintiff to amend its
complaint to conform to the evidence before it as well as the requirements of Rule 17.
However, this is prevented by Rule 15 U.R.C.P. as it would "prejudice the adverse party
(the defendant herein) in maintaining his action or defense on the menu." See England v.
Horbach, 318 UAR 14,17 (Utah 1997). Rule 15 permits "a party to amend his pleading
as a matter of course .. .before a responsive pleading is served... or within 20 days after
it is served." Those times have clearly passed. In all other cases Rule 15 provides that
"leave of court or written consent of the adverse party" is required for amendment. As in
Kleinhert v. Kimball Elevator Co., 214 UAR 43,45 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) the required

3
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necessary amendment has been within plaintiff's knowledge for a long period of time and
the prejudice to the defendant, who has continually raised this issue in its pleadings, is
without question. Therefore, the only action available to this Court is to deny any
amendment to the plaintiff's complaint and dismiss the action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Accord 19 Am Jur 2d § 2216.
c.

In a vain attempt to cure this obvious defect, the plaintiff has attempted in its pleadings to
place the burden for its error on the defendant, by claiming it is the defendant's
responsibility to join Franklin Covey Co. in a compulsory counterclaim action pursuant to
Rule 13 of the U.R.C.P. However, this self serving argument (one more in a long line of
such arguments advanced by the plaintiff) is merely an attempt to avoid the merits of this
matter and keep the defendant from having his day in court. There is no question that
plaintiff raced the defendant to the courthouse with the intent of circumventing defendant's
Maryland action, and then to profit by its actions in front of a friendly forum through a
variety of questionable tactics and pleadings. The defendant has never admitted nor
accepted that this court has either personal jurisdiction over the defendant nor the subject
matter jurisdiction. Invoking the compulsory counterclaim argument is another red
herring3. "If the suit is brought by a party that does not have the capacity to sue on behalf
of the real party in interest the suit is a nullity." (emphasis added) Haro at page 20.
Therefore, the complaint should be dismissed. Without a complaint there "remains no
cause of action to substitute parties,'9 Haro, supra; and such substitution is further
precluded by Rule 15 U.R.C.P. and cases cited herein.

3

It should be noted that one defense not yet raised by the plaintiff but probably waiting in the wings is Rule
17(d) U.R.GP. which permits that when two or more persons associated in business transact such business
under a common name, they can sue and be sued by such common name. This defense is expressly
prohibited by the terms of Rule 17(d) which expressly precludes corporations. See also, Herbertson v. Willow
Creek, 264 UAR 14 (Utah Ct App. 1995) and Herbertson v. Willow Creek, 299 UAR 24 (Utah 1996). Defendant
merely raises it to discourage plaintiff as it casts about for a life raft from trying this particular life raft and
wasting additional court and party resources, time and energy.
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Although should this Court fail to dismiss this action,, 'the defendant wffl argue these points forcibly to the
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defendant' s arguments were "unmeritorous. ' In reading the transcript the reason becomes clear.
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In its response to plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, defendant raised the following
affirmative defenses: (1) there was no express agreement between the parties; (2) the terms of the
April 9, 1997 letter are ambiguous and thus do not preclude an unjust enrichment cause of action;
(3) that defendant's consent to the April 9, 1997 agreement was produced by duress; (4) that there

formed; (5) that the real parly in interest breached its impl ted, covenant of good of good faith and
.fair dealing The trial Court in its meager Summary Judgment findings failed to address any ol
these issues

"Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine .issue of material

fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Crowther v MOM er, 241
I JAR .' ! •' 1 11 llali I il \\)\\ I W«J I Sinn1 I he I 'iwirl Lulu ill In nidi rss .inn ml I In. •.(• kgiliiiiyte issues
.raised by 'the defendant in its findings, it is impossible to determine how 'these impacted the findings
that "w ere made or if they were considered at all In its Opposition to Summary Judgment, the
defendant had further" .argued to the Court that summary judgment was inappropriate at: that juncture
because there were clear factual issues in controversy and that information developed through

6

The defendant questions how 'the Court: would know to be able to make this determination since it never
impartially considered me facts and circumstances related to in personam jurisdiction. Iik?.ly, it was not
necessary for the Court to look further because it then asked plaintiffs counsel to draft the final Order and
plaintiffs counsel had no incentive other than to give this matter short shrift. It is hopcc that a more erudite
reviewer might deign to at least consider the merits of the defendant's arguments and provide the defendant
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T h e errors and issues attributable to the " C o n s e n t to b e B o u n d " document are so iiumni iniis iinid
egregious 'that they are addressed in an accompany ing motion and m e m o r a n d u m and ai e
incorporated b y reference herein

8.
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p l a i n t i f f s argument 'that the April 9, 1 9 9 7 letter of agreement w a s .an express contract: between the
parties which governed all rights and obligations. "I 'his conclusion fails as a matter o f law, see

Bailey-Allen Company, Inc v. Kurzet, 876 P 2d 421 (Utah,. 1994). The reasons include:
a.

T h e agreement is ambiguous in 'that it does not provide for remedies in 'the event o f a breach b y
eithei party. (as occur 1: ed i n this case)

b.

T h e agreement w a s not integrated in that it failed, to state that it w a s "'the entire 'understanding
of the parties a n d could not b e changed except in writing."

c

I lie statement regarding " F r a n k l i n policy

upon which plaintiff so lieav ily relies is ambiguous

in that it includes missing terms, (it refers to services but not products; h o w is the length o\ a*.
iV

i

:ts in the record bet ore ihih x ourt leave open his > ind aminnncm
lj i a i j |

was

it

1* n e and demonstrate

picked arbitrarily" at 'the w h i m of Franklin. Why not a different date? Certainly

- rk- fair consideration... In that event, it is likely that an impartial reviewer will find it: impossible to disregard
^ • • me 0 verre aching
7 ^ftjjfc there is a provision under the "at will employment" section which provides for written changes (and
which undoubtedly plaintiff will attempt to stretch to maximum advantage) the clear wording o f this provision
states "y°ur status as an at-will employee may not be changed or modified by any oral representations to the
contrary . . . E X C E P T if a written contract is executed by you and by the president of Franklin which
specifically revokes the employment at-will relationship. The plain language o f this paragraph makes it clear
that it applies only to the at-will employment relationship and, in n o way, covers, the Ba&y requirement of
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nothing in the Api il 91 !"Il ' lettei intakes clear what: i \ ill constitute termination and what e\ ents \ ill 1
follow as a result), its terms are capable of more 'than one interpretation (e.g. which sen/ices
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included?) Interwest Construction v. i mmer. ;„ yj. I AR 27 (Utah J >96); Winegar i Froerer
Corp * ' * p ' d
1
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J . C j:u /:^/ey stanaard raises the question of whethei :)i not the \|)ri.J 9.

1997 agreement was enforceable at all This question alone is sufficient to prevent a finding as
a matter of lav that the sl pril 9th lettex pi eclude s all re co\ erj by thedefem lant. E i en if the
plaintiff can somehow manage to twist the .facte on 'the record to overcome these deficiencies
this is insufficient for a further finding by the Court on the record before it that an implied
contract does not exist: and the unjust enrichment claim should go for v ard !"l See Trembly v.
Mrs. Fields Cookies 252 UAR 23,26 (Utah Ct App 19 94)

Release (which is again unsupported b> any finding of fact) barred all claims to payment of
compensation. See Tesco v. Lether, 253 UAR 61 (Utah Ct. App. 199 1); 1 hoi nock R Jensen, 332
LIAR I'HUlaliti App IW ).

expressly stating that "it was the entire understanding of the parties," and could, not be changed except in
writing.
8
The plaintiff has continuously attempted to characterize the defendant's unjust enrichment claim as a
quantum meruit claim. Utah law recognizes 'unjust enrichment as a separate cause of action under quanturm
meruit, but with specific requirements that are particularly applicable in this case. See Eatey, supra at page 19.
While the defendant will not argue die merits in the instant motion, this issue is one that is ripe on appeal and
its specific applicability to the .facts in this case are so compeling, the defendant re serves the right to argue its
merits and likely outcomes to an appellate court.
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.and the circumstances surrounding the transactions ... . and is impose -
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about justice." Jeff at page 6. Plaintiffs own pleadings agree thai onu ambiguity is showi* M. I
evidence is not only necessary but required Accord, Interwest.

"Where plaintiff has failed this

provided to the Court regarding 'this issue was in u * .:cu i.i it's supplemental :taicmen Jatcd
^pn

*?'* >i :
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bcdc ,IKS *" ai Klin Covey *
knew
i
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*V the defendant su- -», u
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facts alone, defendant's unjust enrichment claim (which is a legal action for restitution, Bailey at
page 19) cries out for restitution and the opportunity" to be heard in open court: by an impartial trier
o

aid plaintiff has pi esented nothing to this Court to suggest otherwise Iii fact FCCS has

never claimed, .as it cannot, that Franklin Covey Co. received, no benefit from, the Defendant's
work. In fact, it claims in its Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss that it is in need of im\ J fa ii it ?
relief because it is paying the defendant's commissions to others.

ERRORS OF FACT.
AII I! ml* I lit" f Nf r ofs \) I 11 it I a 11 c ged 11 u u 11 »i 11 w t; 11 mi t H " i u i n • 111 ni 1111 he 111 v ad u i p s thai hi \ \ i I >een
provided to this Court: In each case sufficient undisputed evidence has been submitted to raise a
genuine issue of material fact Kleinert supra at page 45. "The extrinsic evidence relied on bj the
parties reinforces the conclusion that a genuine issue of" fact

exists making summary judgment

improper. Wilkrd Pease Oil & Gas Co. v. Pioneer Oil & Gas Co., 26? UAR 46,50 (Utah 1995).
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Further for each of the items i-*+nci

*-uit idik-
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U.R.C.P. ^//ew v : Prudentic? *Q0 UAR 8, 9 (Utah 1992 h h

with the r-. ,

J a*

n, ^iK „ . ; .^ ..,u

)
s,,.. ^

^

UAR 3, 7 (Utah 1994) ri/wg Retherfordv. AT&T Communications, 201 UAR 21 (Utah 1992).
\f
WHEREFORE, for 'the reasons stated above, it is respectfully requested 'that this honorable court issue
an Order granting the relief requested herein

DATED this^day of October, 1998.

ciU:
David Melvin
812 Whittington Terrac.
Silver Spring, Maryland
(301) 593-3364
Defendant, prose

11

Jfli

Cei tiiicate ot'Sei i iic e
I hereby certify that on October" 5, 1998, I served a copy of the foregoing Motion, For Relief
From Judgment Or Order and accompanying Memorandum, on counsel for the plaintiff, Ste\ en Bednar,
370 East South Temple, Suite J'l"!, '"mil I akc Ut>, Utah H'l i l l by first class mail, postage prepaid.

(Xj£rn-- ,
David Melvin
812 Whittington Terrace
Silver Spring, Maryland 20901
(301) 593-3364
Defendant, pro se
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THIRD ClSTSIcr C':l.*!r,

David Melvin
812 Whittington Terrace
Silver Spring, Maryland 20901
(301) 593-3364 FAX (301) 593-2987
Defendant, pro se

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUR
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

: _anklm Cove\ Ghent Sales, Inc.

Civil Case No 980901616MI
Judge David S. Young"
d Mt :

Defendant.

The pro se defendant, David Melvin, respectfully moves 'this Court for an, Order to Modify and/oi
Amend, its Declaratory Judgment Order signed Jul) 27 1,998 and the underl> ing Summary Judgment
Order that suppor ted it signed Jul> 14, 1,998 pursuant to Rule 60 (b)(2) and, (3) of the Utah 'Rules of
Civil Procedure ("herein U.R.C.P.) and to vacate both Orders, dismiss the above entitled cause of action,

motion werefiled,on July 14, 1,998 and July 27, 1,998 respectively, This is motion is being filed oi
Octobt

"

*•. '

- -.

'

-

P.

Newly Discovered Evidence
a.

>H'-'vlint art?ued vi^-rojidv anri frequents Kefon- thi-* ^ "* ^not : \ this Court's
uojeci matter
jurisdiction because *iv esse h*K* **u *r Might bv an improper party, Franklin Cove^
( 'litiil SiiiN s Imi l i n n iiwtfn n < i i mum iiiii MINI siamhiif 1 iiiidl pnnil

1

in irspiiiM' iiii;

plaintiff filed a document entitled "Franklin Covey Co. Consent To Be Bound by Judgment
and Assignment" (Attachment A).
b. The document was signed bv counsel for the plaintiff. FCCS. The document was not
signed under oath. Nor does it establish the basis upon which counsel for FCCS has the
authority to bind Franklin Covey Co.
c.

This document also lacks any reference to statute or case law to assert that it is a proper
pleading of which this Court should take notice. This is of particular note because a
comparison of this document with every other document filed by the plaintiff shows that in
every other case, the plaintiff carefully cites authority for whatever relief it praysfromthe
Court. Also in filing this document counsel for FCCS violated Section 78-51-32 (1) and
(2)oftheUtahCode.

d. Nevertheless, based on this document of extremely dubious probative value, the Court saw
fit to make the following finding in its Declaratory Judgment Order (which again was not
supported by its findings in its Summary Judgment Order): "This actica concerns only one
employee, one employer and one employment relationship." The Cour; noted that FCCS
was a wholly owned subsidiary of Franklin Covey Co., but failed to note the significance
of that fact, as will be discussed in the supporting Memorandum.
e.

Attachment B is a document entitled "Verified Answer of Franklin Covey Co." which was
filed in the case of Thomas M. Bay v. Franklin Covey Co. in the Superior Court for the
State of California, County of Orange. As the Court will note, Franklin Covey Co. is the
defendant in the California case and Attachment B was signed under the pains and
penalties of perjury by a Vice President of Franklin Covey Co. (not an attorney of a
subsidiary). In fact, it was signed by the same individual, John Harding, who signed the
defendant's April 9,1997 agreement with Franklin Covey Co.
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f.

The Court will note that die Fourth Defense set forth in the Verified Complaint signed
under the pains and penalties of perjury by Mr. Harding, Vice President of Franklin Covey
Co. is the following: "[P]laintifFhas failed to name necessary and indispensable parties,
including plaintiff's employer at the time of termination, Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc.'9

g.

If the reasoning behind the Consent to Be Bound is accurate that a Consent to be Bound
obviates the need for proper pleading and procedure, then it is questionable as to why
defendant's Franklin Covey Co.'s counsel chose to plead the said defense, failure to join a
necessary party, namely FCCS, as a defense and permitted his client to sign under the
penalties of perjury. Either FCCS and Franklin Covey Co. are separate entities with
separate rights and responsibilities which require that each be held to account before a
court of law in its ownrightor they are some form of previously unknown unified
corporate entity. FCCS and Franklin Covey Co. cannot have it one way in California and
another in Utah.

h. Alternatively this Court was in error when it failed to exclude the Consent to be Bound by
Judgment and Assignment, a document entirely lacking in probative value but clearly
highly prejudicial, for which there exists no support in Utah practice or law and further
erred in basing its actions on this document including permitting this suit to go forward,
ignoring the standing, privity and other subject matter jurisdiction arguments raised by the
defendant, and granting Declaratory Judgment based upon this document.
i.
2.

The only appropriate remedy at this junction is dismissal.

Misrepresentation and Other Misconduct of an Adverse Party.
a.

Accompanying the instant Motion is a Motion for Sanctions in this matter.

b. In addition to this matter, a case has been filed in Federal District Court in Maryland. In
that case, FCCS, as defendant, was required to file a document entitled "Defendant's
Disclosure of Corporate Affiliations and Financial Interests." In that document counsel for

3
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the plaintiff acknowledged that FCCS is a wholly owned subsidiary of Franklin Covey Co.
and not a division. The case law regarding the rights and responsibilities of parents and
subsidiaries as opposed to parents and divisions is clear and was provided to counsel for
the plaintiff by the defendant. Counsel for the plaintiff chose to ignore the case law and
other authorities brought to his attention and chose to deliberately proceed on a course of
action, which seemed likely to meet with favor with this Court and therefore produce a
positive result heedless of his responsibilities as an officer of the Court,
c.

Section 78-51 -26 of the Utah Code requires: "|T|t is the duty of an attorney and counselor:
(3) to counsel and maintain no other action than that which appears to him legal and just;"
and (4) to employ... such means only as are consistent with truth and never seek to
mislead the judges by artifice or false statement of fact or law." Counsel for the plaintiff
has failed in his duties to the Court under both of these provisions. Further, pursuant 7851 -31 of the Utah Code the defendant moves for damages.
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David Melvin
812 Whittington Terrace
Silver Spring, Maryland 20901
(301) 593-3364 FAX (301) 593-2987
Defendant,prose
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT prpijTY CLr.RK
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc.
Plaintiff,
Civil Case No. 980901616MI
Judge David S. Young
David Melvin,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM
JUDGMENT OR ORDER

1. Newly Discovered Evidence. For a motion based on newly discovered evidence "to succeed, a
party must establish: (1) the existence of newly discovered evidence which is material and
competent; (2) that by due diligence the evidence could not have been discovered and produced
before trial; and (3) that the evidence is not merely cumulative or incidental bi;* is substantial
enough that with the evidence there is a likelihood of a different result. " Prom vc Development
Corp. v. Mattson, 322 UAR 35,37 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), citing Barson v. Efi. Squibb & Sons,
Inc. Attachment A easily meets all 3 prongs of the Promax test. (1) It is clearly material and
competent since it is relevant to the judgment in this case. The verified answer casts doubt on the
"Consent to be Bound Document" which, for the most part, formed the basis for this Court's
findings and judgment. See Promax at page 37. (2) Finding this document at a'l took an almost
heroic effort on the part of ihQ pro se defendant. The defendant lives in Maiy.Vnd, the Bay case

£*•}

has been filed in California. The defendant is an individual, with a family to support and other
obligations to meet and without the resources that a multi national corporation, like the plaintiff, can
muster for intensive investigation. In determining due diligence these factors should weigh heavily.
Certainly first discovering the existence of a lawsuit involving Franklin Covey Co. 3000 miles
away from the defendant's home, and, second, obtaining the pleadings from an unknown court, all
within a reasonably short period of time, should be cause for approbation for the defendant's
dedication and diligence to his cause. The defendant and Mr. Bay are not kno\m to each other,
perhaps they once nodded to each other across the room at some convention, bia that would likely
be an overstatement of their connection. Mr. Bay served Franklin Covey Co. in a completely
different capacity than the defendant and they live on opposite coasts. The proof of service shows
that the Verified Complaint in Mr. Bay's case was not served upon counsel for Mr. Bay in
California until June 26,1998, which was the same date that this Court held its hearing on FCCS'
Motion for Summary Judgment. The defendant learned of the lawsuit only at 12ater date and with
great difficulty acquired the pleadings. The fact that this matter is being brought to the attention of
this Court within the 90 days required by Rule 60 should be facially sufficient to demonstrate due
diligence; (3) there can be no question that this document is not merely cumulat ve or incidental
since it sinks the plaintiff, FCCS's only hope for establishing itsrightto sue as i real party in
interest as required by Rule 17 U.RX.P. and as an "interested" party as required by Section 78-332 of the Utah Code. It also sinks the plaintiff's contention that its failure to join Franklin Covey Co.
pursuant to Section 78-33-11 of the Utah Code will not impact the effect of this Court's
Declaratory Judgment Order. The only appropriate remedy at this juncture is dismissal.
2.

Lack of Probative Value.

"When a corporation sues or is sued in its corporate name, the action

is by or against the corporation itself as a legal entity." 19 Am Jur 2d §2173.
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A parent

corporation is not necessarily a party to an action involving a subsidiary." 19 Am Jur 2d §2174.
"Generally service of process on a subsidiary is not valid as service upon a parent corporation, nor
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is service on the parent valid as to the subsidiary." 19 Am Jur 2d §2193. In other words, under
general principles of corporate law, parents and subsidiaries are separate and distinct entities and
cannot sue or be sued on behalf of each other except in very specialized circumstances. Utah law is
in accord.
a.

"A corporation, be it parent or subsidiary, has its own legal identity and existence.
Common ownership or control does not automatically destroy that separate identity.
Although in appropriate cases equity may look through the corporate shell to its alter ego
to preventfraudor wrongdoing, the general rule still applies that corporations are separate
legal entities bound by the obligations as well as the benefits." Institutional Laundry v.
Utah State Tax Commission, 706 P.2d 1066,1067 (Utah, 1985), citing Surgical Supply
Center v. Industrial Commission of Utah, Dept. of Employment Security, 223 P. 2d 593,
595 (Utah, 1950). Franklin Covey Co. and FCCS are separate legal enities, each bound by
its own obligations and benefits. Therefore, it was totally inappropriate for FCCS to
attempt to obtain judgment against the defendant on behalf of Franklin Covey Co. without
joining Franklin Covey Co. Even more to the point, "[I]n this situation the consideration of
justice, which so requires is simply that a controlling corporation, such is Omnico, should
not be permitted to manage and operate a business from which it stands to gain whatever
profit may be made, have the advantage of the efforts of those who ser vs i t and then use
nomenclature of another corporation as a facade to insulate it from responsibility for
paving for such services." (emphasis added) Chatterly v. Omnico, 4SJ P.2d 667, 670
(Utah, 1971). While the relationship between the plaintiff and Frankli*; Covey Co., aside
from the fact that the plaintiff is a wholly owned subsidiary, remains a mystery in terms of
plaintiffs relationship with the defendant, if any, the fact remains that the Franklin Covey
Co. operated a business which employed the defendant, had the advantage of the
defendant's efforts on its behalf, and made money from his efforts. It i', a misuse of the
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powers of this Court to ask it to sanction an attempt by FCCS and Franklin Covey Co. to
evade Franklin Covey Co. 's legal responsibilities and obligations. "Th?re is no doubt
about the correctness of the proposition urged by the defendant that a party should not be
permitted to use corporations of similar names to engage in a now you see it, now you
don't legerdemain and thus trick or cheat another." Centurion Corp. v. Fiberchem, Inc.,
562 P.2d 1252,1253 (Utah, 1977.) This exactly what the plaintiflF, FCCS, and its counsel
has been attempted to do. By the artful use of the nomenclature "Franklin Covey''it has
attempted to obscure the legal distinction between the separate legal entities FCCS and
Franklin Covey Co. in order to evade Franklin Covey Co.'s responsibilities and deny the
defendant his day in court. However, this "artful pleading" should not be sanctioned by
this Court particularly in light of the fact that Franklin Covey Co. has :;ow admitted under
oath through a lawful, clearly designated representative, that it and FCCS are separate
companies,
b. The only theory upon which the plaintiffs contention could possibly be permitted is if it
had (and it has not) conditioned its "Consent to be Bound" on the theory of "alter ego."
However, to prevail with such a theory requires a specific showing that: " (1) there must
be such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation
and the individual no longer exist, viz., the corporation is, in fact, the aiter ego of one or a
few individuals; and (2) the observance of the corporate form would sanction a fraud,
promote injustice, or an inequitable result." {emphasis added) Schafir v. Harrigan, 245
Utah Adv. Rep. 15,17 (Utah Ct. of App. 1994) citing Norman v. Murray First Thrift &
Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1979.) See also Diston v. Enviropak Medical Products,
Inc., 261 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 25 (Utah Ct. of App. 1995) in which the court found that the
defense of alter ego can also be applied between corporations as well as individuals and
corporations. There has been no such showing as required by Schafir iti this case. The

sole document filed by the plaintiff in this case to support an alter ego contention is of
dubious evidentiary value at best and fails completely when compared to die verified
California document. Under these circumstances at a minimum the summary judgment
should be reversed since for all of the reasons stated in both this and the accompanying
motions, and the case dismissed
c.

Finally, since this court has authority and indeed in light of recent facts, the obligation, to
apply the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel in dismissing this case. In Lake Philgsas Service v.
Valley Bank & Trust Co., 204 Utah Adv. Rep. 24,28 (Utah Ct. of App. 1993) citing
CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., Ill P.2d 967 (Utah 1989), the court affirmed
the three elements necessary for a successful equitable estoppel defence, which are; "(1) a
statement, admission, act or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim later
asserted; (2) reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken or not taken on the
basis of the first party's statement, admission, act or failure to act; and (3) injury to the
second party that would result from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such
statement, admission, act or failure to act." In this case the FCCS has clearly asserted one
claim which is inconsistent with the later California claim - the later ciitim carrying greater
evidentiary value; the defendant has acted reasonable in bringing this matter to the court at
the first opportunity; and substantial injury result to the defendant were this Court to not to
reverse its previous Orders, estop the plaintiff from seeking to amend us pleadings based
on its own misconduct, thus dismissing the case with prejudice.

3.

Misrepresentation and Other Misconduct of an Adverse Party.
a.

"Under general principles of agency, an instrument, to be binding on ths corporation must
be executed in such manner as to show it to be the corporation's act; otherwise it will bind
the individual officer or agent." Therefore, the instrument entered into by the officer or
agent "must be executed in such a manner as to show on its face that it was the intention.
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. . to bind the corporation and not the officer or agent individually." "Unless the intention
to bind the corporation is manifest, the fact that the officer executing this instrument adds
his official designation after his signature, is not sufficient to make the instrument binding
upon the corporation; it is binding on the officer personally." 19 C. J.S. Section 591 Other
than the designation "attorneys for Franklin Covey Co." there is nothing on the face of the
pleading entitled "Consent to Be Bound," unlike the very specific verification in
Attachment A, that allows a fact finder to determine that it is manifest that Franklin Covey
Co. intended to be bound by this document and that designation alone is insufficient.
Further, plaintiff's counsel violated Section 78-51-32(2) of the Utah Code in failing to file
with the clerk or this Court any documentation of his authority. "When reviewing the
validity of an affidavit made on behalf of a corporation a distinction is made between those
affidavits made by mere corporate agents and those made by agents who are also corporate
officers... The requisites are more stringent forjudging the sufficiency of affidavits
executed on behalf of a corporation by an agent of the corporation who is not a corporate
officer. For example, the personal knowledge of such an agent regarahg the facts to which
he has sworn will generally not be presumed, and therefore, the specific 'means and
sources' of his information should be shown." Utah Farm Credit Association v. Watts,
757 P.2d 154,157 (Utah 1987). The Consent to be Bound in the instant case has even less
validity than a sworn affidavit and certainly less than the California verified document,
since it was not made pursuant to the pains and penalties of perjury. At a minimum it
should be judged in light of the same requirements for documents that have higher
probative value. In that light it fails miserably.1

1

It is interesting to note that plaintiffs counsel, who in all other pleadings has painstakingly detailed both
statutory and case authorities for its pleadings, fails to do either in this pleading because lone exists.
Interestingly, when the defendant erroneously entitled a motion, Motion for Reconsideration, plaintiffs
counsel took him to task chastising him because such Motions are not specifically provided for in the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, even though there is case law to support such motions. See Watkiss & Campbell v.
Foa&Son, 808 P.2d 1061,1064 (Utah 1991); Runnier v. OVell, 215 UAR 57, 58-9, (Utah Ct App. 1993).
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b. Plaintiff's counsel violated Section 78-51-26(3) and (4) of the Utah Cede when he chose to
create and then submit the "Consent to be Bound" At the time, plaintiff's counsel well
knew that two separate companies existed and that his case would fail were he to admit
that fact. Instead, to prevent thatfromhappening, and in order to preserve his advantage in
the race to the courthouse, he chose to create a document which was misleading, lacking in
probative value, irrelevant in terms of creating the necessary standing tor subject matter
jurisdiction and highly prejudicial. The intention was clearly to undermine the
requirements for subject matter jurisdiction required under Utah law. But, presumably the
hope was that a local Court would provide greater leniency for such a pleading and
plaintiff a counsel hope seems to have been justified. This Court chose to grant a Summary
Judgment Order and an overly broad Declaratory Judgment Order relying entirely upon
plaintiff's counsel's invalid pleading. Therefore, it is incumbent upon this Court not only
to dismiss this matter with prejudice for the reasons cited herein and in the accompanying
motions and memorandum, but also to take appropriate action pursuant to Section 78-5131 of the Utah Code against plaintiff's counsel. The defendant request.; damages and any
other appropriate sanctions.

7
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CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, for the reasons stated above, it is respectfully requested that this honorable court issue
an Order granting the relief requested herein.

DATED tfaisO day of October, 1998.

(JU~

David Melvin
812 Whittington Terrace
Silver Spring, Maryland 20901
(301) 593-3364
Defendant,/?™ se

ss*

Certificate of Service
*fc
I hereby certify that on October Q, 1998,1 served a copy of die foregoing Motion For Relief
From Judgment Or Order and accompanying Memorandum on counsel for the plaintiff, Steven Bednar,
370 East South Temple, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 by Federal Express.

David Melvin
812 Whittington Terrace
Silver Spring, Maryland 20901
(301)593-3364
Defendant, pro se

9

ATTACHMENT A

r

Clark Waddoups (CBN58546)
Robert S. Clark (CBN93634)
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
P.O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Telephone: (801)532-7840
Attorneys for Defendant Franklin Covey Co. —
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SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF ORANGE
CASE NO. 793884

THOMAS M. BAY,
Plaintiff,

VERIFIED ANSWER OF
FRANKLIN COVEY CO.

vs.
FRANKLIN COVEY CO., a Utah
corporation; NUCI THOMPSON,
a California resident; and DOES 1
through 50, inclusive,

Judge Richard O. Frazee Sr.
Depc. 25

Defendants.

Defendant Franklin Covey Co. ("Franklin Covey") answers as follows Plaintiff's
Verified Complaint dated April 28, 1998:
FIRST DEFENSE
The Verified Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
SECOND DEFENSE
Franklin Covey responds as follows to the allegations contained in the followingindicated paragraphs of the Verified Complaint:
1.

For lack of knowledge or information sufficient -to form a belief as to the

truth thereof, denies.
2.

Admits that Franklin Covey is a corporation existing under the laws of die

Scate of Utah. Upon information and belief, denies the remaining allegations.
3.

Upon information and belief, denies.

4.

Upon information and belief, denies.

S3X

I

5.

Because none of the allegations in this paragraph are directed at Franklin

2

Covey no answer is required. To the extent, however, that any of the allegations in this

3

paragraph are directed at Franklin Covey, the same are denied.
[Facts]

4
5

6.

Admits that Bay was employed by-Franklin International Institute, Inc.,

6

and its successors, and that Bay conducted and spoke at seminars scheduled by the

7

company. Denies the remaining allegations.

8
9
10

7.

Admits that Bay's employment was terminated. Admits that on or about

November 18, 1997, John R. Harding sent Bay a letter concerning such termination.
Franklin Covey alleges that the letter speaks for itself. Denies the remaining allegations.

11

8.

Denies.

12

9.

Denies.

13
14
15
16

[First Cause of Action]
10.

Franklin Covey hereby incorporates the foregoing responses to the

allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 9 of the Verified Complaint.
11.

Upon information and belief, denies.

17

(a)(1)

Denies.

18

(a)(2)

Denies,

19

(b)

Denies.

20

12.

Denies.

21

(a)

Denies.

22

(b)

Denies.

23

(c)

Denies.

24

(d)

Denies.

25

(e)

Denies.

26
27
28
-2f franJclmUrankUn.an* kim/J
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1

13.

Admits that Bay's employment was terminated. Franklin Covey

2

affirmatively alleges that such termination was proper and lawful. Denies the remaining

3

allegations.

4

14.

Denies.

5

15.

Denies.

6
71
8
9 ]|

[Second Cause of Action]
16.

Franklin Covey hereby incorporates the foregoing responses to the

allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 15 of the Verified Complaint.
17.

Upon information and belief, denies.

10

(a)

Denies.

11

(b)

Denies.

12

(c)

Denies.

13

(d)

Denies.

14 !1

(e)

Denies.

15

(f)

Denies.

16

(g)

Denies.

17 ||

18.

Denies.

18

00

Denies.

19

(b)

Denies.

20

(c)

Denies.

21

(d)

Denies.

22

(e)

Denies.

23 |j

19.

Denies.

24 I

20.

Denies.

25 II
26 I
27 J

[Third Cause of Action]
21.

Franklin Covey hereby incorporates the foregoing responses to the

allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 20 of the Verified Complaint.

28
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22.

Denies.
(a)

Denies.

(b)

Denies.

(c)

Denies.

(d)

Denies.

23.

Denies.

24.

Denies.

25.

Denies.

26.

Denies.

27.

Denies.

THIRD DEFENSE
(DENIAL OF ALLEGATIONS NOT SPECIFICALLY ADMITTED)
28.

Franklin Covey denies each and every allegation contained in the Verified

Complaint that is not specifically admitted herein.
FOURTH DEFENSE
(FAILURE TO JOIN NECESSARY AND INDISPENSABLE PARTES)
29.

Plaintiff has failed to name necessary and indispensable parties, including

plaintiffs employer at the time of his termination, Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc.
FIFTH DEFENSE
(TRUTH)
30.

Some or all of the statements of which plaintiff complains are true or

substantially true.
SIXTH DEFENSE
(OPINION)
31.

Some or all of the statements of which plaintiff complains arc not provably

false statements of fact, but rather constitute protected expressions of opinion and
therefore are not actionable

-4(/rank ImU'nnklin ins* klm))
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SEVENTH DEFENSE
(PUBLIC FIGURE)
32.

Plaintiff is a public figure and no statement about which he may be heard

to complain was published with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the
truth, and therefore is privileged.
EIGHTH DEFENSE
(PRIVILEGE - CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(c))
33.

Some or all of the statements of which plaintiff complains are privileged

pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 47(c).
NINTH DEFENSE
(INCREMENTAL HARM DOCTRINE)
34.

Some or all of the statements of which plaintiff complains are not actionable

under the incremental harm doctrine.
TENTH DEFENSE
(U.S. CONST. AMENDS. 1 AND 14)
35.

Plaintiffs defamation claims are barred by the First and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution.
ELEVENTH DEFENSE
(ACTS AND OMISSIONS OF PLAINTIFF)
36.

Plaintiffs own acts and omissions directly caused or directly contributed to

any damages he claims to have sustained.
TWELFTH DEFENSE
(ACTS OF THIRD PARTIES/INDEPENDENT INTERVENING CASES)
37.

Some or all of the damages to which plaintiff complains were the result of the

fault and/or the actions of third parties over whom Franklin Covey had no control and/or
were the result of independent intervening causes.
THIRTEENTH DEFENSE
(ESTOPPELAVAIVERyLACHES)
38.

Some or all of plaintiffs claims are barred by the doctrines of estoppel,

waiver and/or laches.

-5[frank iinUranklin. aiu< k lot)}
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FOURTEENTH DEFENSE
(ECONOMIC LOSS RULE)

1
2
39.

Some or ail of plaintiff's claims are barred by the economic loss rule.

3
FIFTEENTH DEFENSE
(FAILURE TO MITIGATE)

4
5

40.

Plaintiff has failed to mitigate the damages he claims to have sustained.
SIXTEENTH DEFENSE
(GOOD FAITH)

6
7
41.

Employer acted fairly and in good faith in terminating plaintiff's employment.

8
SEVENTEENTH DEFENSE
(WORKER'S COMPENSATION ACT)

9

io i;

n

42.

The causes of action set forth in Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint are barred, in

whole or in part, by the Workers Compensation Act.
EIGHTEENTH DEFENSE
(AT-WILL EMPLOYEE)

12
13
43.

Plaintiff was employed as an at-will employee.

14
15

NINETEENTH DEFENSE
(EXPRESS WRITTEN AGREEMENT OF TERMINATION AT-WILL)

16

44.

17

Plaintiff was employed under an express, written agreement by which he

expressly agreed that his employment was terminable at-will.

18

Wherefore, defendant Franklin Covey Co. demands that plaintiffs Verified

19

Complaint be dismissed with prejudice and upon its merits, and that it be awarded its costs,

20

expenses, and attorneys fees, and for such other and further relief as the Coun deems

21

appropriate.

22

*

DATED this^^afay of June 1998.

23
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS

24
25
26

Waddoups
Robert S. Clark
Attorneys for Defendant Franklin Covey Co.

27
28
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VERIFICATION
2
3

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ORANGE
I have read the foregoing VERIFIED ANSWER OF FRANKLIN COVEY CO.

4
[ j

I am a party to this action. The matters stated in the foregoing document are
true and of my own personal knowledge except as to those matters which are stated
on information and belief, and as to those matters I believe them to be true.

[x]

I am an Officer [ J a partner
[y\ a Vice President of
Franklin Covey Co., a parry to this action and am authorized to make this
verification for and on its behalf, and I make this verification for that reason. [ ] I
am informed and believe and on that ground allege that the matters stated in the
foregoing document are true. [X] The matters stated in the foregoing document are
true of my own knowledge except as to those matters which are stated on information
and belief, and as to those matters I believe them to be true.

[ ]

14

I am one of the attorneys for
,a
party to this action. Such party is absent from the county of aforesaid where such
attorneys have their offices, and I make this verification on behalf of that party for
that reason. I am informed and believe and on that ground allege that die matters
stated in the foregoing document are true.

15

Executed on

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

16
17

ZO**

TH

, 1998 at Salt Lake City, Utah.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
foregoing is true and correct.

18
19
John j(/ Harding

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
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Sit

STATE OF UTAH
: ss.
County of Salt Lake
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this ^ U
.
QvfrrrU , 1998, by

day of

XRTPUBLIC

Residine at:

AfrC./f AJJ>, Af~J

[ frank tinWrau l»n. uu( k im)]
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PROOF OF SERVICE

1
2

I, the undersigned, declare and say:
3
4

1.
I am employed with the law firm of Parr Waddoups Brown Gee &. Loveless,
whose address is 185 South State Street, Suite 1300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; 1 am not
a party to the cause; and I am over the age of eighteen years.

5
2.

On the date hereof, I caused to be personally served the attached:

6
VERIFIED ANSWER OF FRANKLIN COVEY CO.
7
8
9
10
11
12

by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed as shown below, and
then sealing and depositing that envelope in a designated and regularly maintained Federal
Express location, with servicejjr delivery fees prepaid or provided tor, at Salt Lake City,
Utah, for delivery on theOG>Hiav of June 1998.
Randall S. Waier, Esq.
One Newport Place
1303 Dove Street, Suite 760
Newport Beach, California 92660

Attornevs for Plaintiff

13
14
15

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
above is true and correct.

*^A

Executed thi:

ay of June 1998 at Salt Lake City, Utah.

16

1 yUfl/i7<w\

17

Kathy Montgorri
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26'
27
28
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ATTACHMENT B

MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW
& BEDNAR, LLC
Steven C.Bednar #5660
Candice Anderson #7456
370 East South Temple, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-5678
Attorneys for Plaintiff Franklin Covey
Client Sales, Inc.
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

FRANKLIN COVEY CLIENT SALES,
INC., a Utah corporation,
•

Plaintiff,

)
)
])

FRANKLIN COVEY CO.
CONSENT TO BE BOUND BY
JUDGMENT AND ASSIGNMENT

V.

J

DAVID MELVTN, an individual,

]i

Civil No. 980901616 MI

]i

Judge David S. Young

Defendant.

Plaintiff Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. ("Plaintiff) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Franklin Covey Co. Defendant David Melvin ("Defendant") contends that Franklin Covey Co.,
rather than Plaintiff, was his employer and is thus the real party-in-interest in this action.
Franklin Covey Co. hereby asserts that Plaintiff was, in fact, Defendant's employer during the
relevant time period and that Plaintiff is the real party-in-interest in this action. Nevertheless,
Franklin Covey Co. hereby consents to be bound by the Judgment entered in this action to the
same extent as Plaintiff, including any counterclaims which may be asserted by Defendant.

Further, Franklin Covey Co; hereby acknowledges an assignment to Plaintiff of anyrightswhich
may be necessary (if any) to entitle Plaintiff to prosecute this action as the real-party-in-interest.
DATED this 9

day of June 1998.
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW & BEDNAR, LLC

Steven C. Bednar
Candice Anderson
Attorneys For Franklin Covey Co.

5M^

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing FRANKLIN COVEY
CO. CONSENT TO BE BOUND BY JUDGMENT AND ASSIGNMENT to be mailed, postage
prepaid thistf**day of June, 1998 to the following:
Mark L. Hessel, Esq.
Suite 307
11501 Georgia Avenue
Wheaton, MD 20902
David Melvin
812 Whittington Terrace
Silver Spring, Maryland 20901
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ATTACHMENT C

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
SOUTHERN DIVISION

DAVID MELVIN,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action Number: AW 98-655

v.
FRANKLIN COVEY CO., ET AL.,
Defendants.

DEFENDANTS' DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE
AFFILIATIONS AND FINANCIAL INTERESTS
Pursuant to Local Rule 103(3), Defendants Franklin Covey Co. ("Franklin Covey") and
Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. ("FCCS") (collectively "Defendants"), attached hereto as
Exhibit A is a listing of all of the subsidiaries of Franklin Covey and FCCS. None of (he
other affiliated companies is a party and none has a financial interest in the outcome of the
litigation.
By:

Steven C. Bednar
Candice Anderson
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW &
BEDNAR, LLC
370 E. South Temple, Suite 200
Salt Lake City. UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-5678
Lead Counsel for Defendants Franklin Covey
Co. and Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc.

Q^l

/fJCJZ^

Brian NuterangeJo (Bar No. 13801)
Samuel Walker (Bar No. 12304)
WILEY, REIN & FIELDING
1776 K Street, N.W.
Washington, DC. 20006
Telephone: (202)429-7000
Co-counsel for Defendants Franklin
Covey Co. and Franklin Covey Client
Sales, Inc.

CERTIFICATE OF SERYICE
I hereby certify that 1 caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS'
DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND FINANCIAL INTERESTS to be
hand-deiivered this v"* day of May, 1998 to the following:
Mark L. HesseJ, Esq.
Suite 307
11501 Georgia Avenue
Whcaton, MD 20902

Brian Nuterangelo

FRANKUN Covey CO.

Whrilr-Qvrncd flwtofliirica
Franklin Development Corporation U Utah corporation)
Franklin Covey Europe* Inc. (a Utah corporation)
Franklin Covey Canada, Ltd. (an Ontario corporation)
Knmkiiti tLxcdlaicCt Ioc« (a Utah corporation)
Franklin International Alia, Inc. (a Utah corporation)
Franklin Covey Australia, Inc (a Utah corporation)
Franklin Covey NZ* Inc (a Utah corporation)
Franklin Covey Mexico, Iuc (a Utah corporation)
Franklin Covey Taiwan, Inc. (a Utah corporation)
Franklin Covey Argentina, Inc. (a Utah ootporatiou)
Franklin Covey Brazil, Inc. (a Utah corporation)
Franklin Covey Spain* Inc (a Utah corporation)
Franklin Covey Puerto Rico, Inc (a Puerto Rico corporation) *
Franklin Covey SA, Inc (a Utah corporation)
Franklin Covey ASC, Inc (a Utah corporation}
Publisher* Preis, Inc (a Utah corporation)
Franklin Covey Client Sakv Inc (a Utah coiporatioo)
Franklin Covey Catalog Sales, Inc. (a Utah evaporation)
Franklin Covey Product &riej, Inc. (a Utah corporation)
Franklin Covey Servku, L L C (a Utah limited liability company)
Fnuikliti Covey Marketing Ltd. (a Utah limited pajtjicrahip)
Franklin Covey Travel, Inc. (a Utah corporation)
,

Check Advantage Plus, Inc (a Utah corporation)
Premier Agendas, Inc (a Wajhinpou corporation)
Premier School Agenda*, Lid. (a British Columbia corporation)
Premier Grephici, LP. (a Waihinttou limited partnerslup)
l?ivttk)fl|

Franklin Covey Consulting Croup (formeriy Shipley Ajjociaxea)
Franklin Covey Lurimte of Fitncaj (formerly National hutirutc of Fitness (NIF7)
Time Systems (TSD
Productivity Plus fPPD
Sporu Careen Diviiioa (formerly Stratford American Sporti Corp)
Personal Coechinf Divbkm (formeriy TrucNorih Corporation)
Software Solution* Division (formeriy Crephie Computer Solutions, Inc)
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MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW
& BEDNAR, LLC
Steven C. Bednar, #5660
James L. Barnett, #7462
370 East South Temple, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-5678

:

t<^

Attorneys for Plaintiff

* &

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

FRANKLIN COVEY CLIENT SALES,
INC., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

FRANKLIN COVEY'S MEMORANDUM
IN OPPOSITION TO MELVIN'S
MOTIONS FOR RELIEF FROM
JUDGMENT OR ORDER
Civil No. 980901616MI

DAVID MELVTN, an individual,
Judge David S. Young
Defendant.

Defendant David Melvin ("Melvin") has filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment or
Order under Rule 60(b)(1) and a separate Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order under Rules
60(b)(1) and (2) (Melvin's "Motions"). Plaintiff, Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. ("Franklin
Covey"), by and through its counsel of record and pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of
Judicial Administration, submits this Memorandum in Opposition to Melvin's Motions. Rather
than file separate Memoranda, Franklin Covey addresses both of Melvin's Motions and his
arguments under Rules 60(b)(l)-(3) in this Memorandum.

G:\fral9023\100melvin\Opp.M.Relief.wpd
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INTRODUCTION
Melvin was a Franklin Covey salesman. He had an express employment agreement which
stated: "According to Franklin policy, commissions are paid only for those services delivered
while you are employed by Franklin." Through counsel, Melvin threatened suit under quantum
meruit for commissions on sales which occurred after his termination. Franklin Covey sought
and received a declaration that Melvinfs express employment agreement precluded his claim. En
route to obtaining declaratory relief, Franklin Covey and the Court waded through a constant
flow of procedural and jurisdictional bickering from Melvin on topics such as removal, personal
jurisdiction and standing.
Melvinfs Rule 60(b) Motions ask the Court to revisit virtually all of Melvin's previously
unsuccessful tactics and arguments and reach a different result. Melvin claims newly discovered
evidence "sinks" Franklin Covey's position. This newly discovered evidence is an Answer to a
Complaint filed in California against Franklin Covey Co., in which it is asserted that Franklin
Covey Client Sales, Inc. was the plaintiffs actual employer (which is identical to the assertion
made by Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. and Franklin Covey Co. in this action). This "newly
discovered" evidence is consistent with and supports Franklin Covey's position and this Court's
determination.
Professing confusion as to the identity of his employer, Franklin Covey Co., as a nonparty, filed a pleading entitled Consent to be Bound by Judgment and Assignment. This
pleading advised the Court that Franklin Covey Co. agreed to be bound by any judgment in the
action to the same extent as its wholly-owned subsidiary, who was Melvin's actual employer, and
also informed the Court that Franklin Covey Co. had assigned any rights necessary (if any) to
G:\fTaI9023\l00mclvin\OppM.Reliefwpd
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allow Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. to prosecute the action as the real party in interest.
Melvin has taken violent offense at this document. Melvin alleges the pleading is a fraud and
asserts the Franklin Covey's counsel lacked authority to submit the pleading. Melvin's virulent
response to the pleading seems to stem from the fact that he mistakes the document as an
insufficient attempt to effect an assignment, rather than merely providing notice to the Court that
the assignment occurred. Melvin's tantrum is irrelevant and misguided for three reasons: (1) the
identity of his employer is irrelevant to the outcome because his employment relationship is
governed by an undisputed agreement; (2) the Court was presented with Melvin's W-2
establishing that his employer was Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc., and (3) Melvin was
provided with a copy of the actual assignment executed by the President of Franklin Covey Co.
and the Vice President of Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. Melvin's Rule 60(b) Motions are
frivolous and should be denied.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On July 14,1998, this Court entered its Order denying Melvin's Motions to

Dismiss and granting Franklin Covey's Motion for Summary Judgment. A copy of the Order is
attached hereto as Exhibit A.
2.

On July 27, 1998, this Court entered Declaratory Judgment in favor of Franklin

Covey. A copy of the Declaratory Judgment is attached hereto as Exhibit B. The Declaratory
Judgment determined that: (1) Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Franklin Covey Co., is a "person interested" under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-33-1, et seq.\ and (2)
Franklin Covey has no obligation to pay Melvin commissions or any other compensation for
sales which occurred after his termination from employment. See Exhibit B.
G:\fral9023\100mclvin\Opp.M.Rcliefwpd
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ARGUMENT
The pro se defendant's1 Motions for Relief from Judgment or Order improperly seeks an
opportunity to relitigate virtually every issue previously decided against Melvin. Melvinfs asks
for an opportunity to relitigate based upon "newly discovered evidence" which is merely
cumulative and confirms the propriety of the Court's prior rulings.2
Having failed to perfect a timely appeal of this Court's decision, Melvin now files Rule
60(b) Motions encompassing the entire case. Melvin's purpose is clear: he now asks the trial
court to function as its own court of appeals; and, upon denial of his Rule 60(b) Motions will file
a new appeal hoping to regain the already lost appellate jurisdiction of the entire case through his
denied motions, which have been incorrectly characterized as Rule 60(b) Motions. As explained
by Wright & Miller, "Rule 60 is not a substitute for appeal." Wright, Miller & Kane, 11
Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil Second § 2851 at 230 (1995) (emphasis added). Moreover,
it is a "perversion of the rule and its purpose to permit it to be used to circumvent another rule"
and should not be used to artificially extend a party's time to appeal. Id. § 2858 at 276; see also,
Mr. Melvin has repeatedly called attention to his status as *pro se defendant and asks this Court for
special treatment. See, e.g., Melvin's Motion to Stay Enforcement of Judgment at ^f 4. However, it is unclear
whether Mr. Melvin has been, or will be, proceeding pro se. On June 19, 1998, Melvin's wife, Marsha Melvin,
submitted a declaration twice stating that David Melvin was proceeding pro se, but making repeated references to
her participation in preparing pleadings. Several months later, on September 10, 1998, Franklin Covey received a
communication from Melvin's wife, who then identified herself as Marsha Ostrer. Ms. Ostrer advised that she
was an attorney (and former federal prosecutor) and that she was now representing Mr. Melvin in this action.
A copy Ms. Ostrer's confirmation letter is attached as Exhibit C. On October 6, 1998, Franklin Covey received a
second letter from Ms. Ostrer corn%ming her intention to apply pro hac vice but indicating that "Mr. Melvin will be
proceeding pro se for the present. Since I do not formally represent him, I cannot speak on his behalf." (Emphasis
added). In closing, Ms. Ostrer informally stated: "[a] communication from Mr. Melvin to you, along with additional
items [five motions and memoranda] are enclosed." A copy of Ms. Ostrer's October 6th letter is also included at
Exhibit C.
2

Both of Melvin's Rule 60(b) Motions ask this Court to modify and/or amend its prior rulings. To the
extent Melvin seeks this relief, this Court may dismiss these Motions as untimely Rule 59 motions as they were not
filed within ten days after entry of judgment Utah R. Civ. P. 59(c).
G:\fifal9023\100melvin\Opp.M.ReIief.wpd
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Holbrook v. Hodson, 24 Utah 2d 120, 466 P.2d 843 (1970) (refusing to allow Rule 60 motion to
extend time for appeal); Anderson v. Anderson, 3 Utah 2d 277, 288 P.2d 845 (1955) (same).
This Court should refuse to allow Melvin's attempted end-run around the rules of appellate
procedure.
Rule 60(b)(1) countenances a motion for relief from judgment based upon a "mistake,"
such as an incorrect calculation or an erroneous description of property. However, courts are in
near unanimous agreement that an appeal is the appropriate remedy where a party claims a
misconception of law by the trial court. Wright & Miller § 2858 at 293-98. Here, Melvin asks
this Court to revisit almost every issue without identifying any "mistake" other than his
disagreement with the Court's conclusions. For example, Melvin attempts to resurrect his two
motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Melvin's 60(b)(1) Memorandum at f 5.
Based upon the pleadings, this Court found that Melvin's motions were unmeritorious. See
Exhibit A. In making this determination, the Court was apprized of the fact that Melvin made at
least ten trips to Utah related to his employment and that he alleged in his complaint filed in
Maryland federal court that Franklin Covey owed him commissions specifically arising out of
his efforts in Utah to solicit a major new customer.3 Melvin fails to explain how this Court's
conclusion was a "mistake" and instead merely rehashes his prior argument. Melvin's 60(b)(1)
Memorandum at f 5.
Further, Melvin complains that this Court erred in finding that the same result is required
under both Utah and Maryland law because "Maryland law was never briefed nor presented to

3

See Franklin Covey's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction or to Change Venue at 1-4.
G:\fral9023\100mclvin\Opp.M.Rclicf.wpd
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the Court." Melvin's 60(b)(1) Motion at f 1(b). In fact, Franklin Covey briefed this issue and
presented the Court with Maryland case law which Melvin ignored.4 Moreover, Melvin
completely fails to explain why this Court's ruling was wrong. Melvin's 60(b)(1) Memorandum
at 1. "[RJelief will not be granted under Rule 60(b)(1) merely because a party is unhappy with
the judgment. Instead, the party must make some showing of why he was justified in failing to
avoid mistake or inadvertence." Wright & Miller § 2858 at 276-77. Melvin's mere repetition of
his defeated arguments is not enough.
Melvin's primary complaint is this Court's determination that Franklin Covey is a "person
interested," and thus had standing to prosecute this declaratory judgment action. Melvin claims
to have found "newly discovered evidence" that "sinks the plaintiff, [Franklin Covey Client Sales
Inc.'s] only hope for establishing its right to sue as a real party in interest." Melvin's 60(b)(2) and
(3) Memorandum at % 1. Moreover, Melvin claims that Franklin Covey has played a "now you
see it, now you don't" shell-game in order to "insulate it from responsibility." Id. at f 2(a).
Notwithstanding Melvin's climatic build-up, there is no smoking gun. In fact, Melvin's
"newly discovered evidence" consists of an Answer to a Complaint filed in California against
Franklin Covey Co. by a former employee. In that pleading, Franklin Covey Co. asserts failure
to join an indispensable party as an affirmative defense because, just as in this case, the actual
employer was Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc.5 If this pleading were a smoking gun, it would
4

See Franklin Covey's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 5-6; Defendant's
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 1-9.
5

See Melvin's 60(b)(2) and (3) Memorandum at Exhibit A (Verified Complaint at f 29) stating "Plaintiff
has failed to name necessary and indispensable parties, including plaintiffs employer at the time of his termination,
Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc." For examples showing this is consistent with plaintiffs position here see
Complaint at % 1; Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 2; Franklin Covey Co.'s
G:\ftal9023\100melvin\Opp.M.ReHefwpd
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be Melvin, not Franklin Covey, who would be caught red-handed. Instead, this pleading is
merely cumulative. See Putvin v. Thompson, 878 P.2d 1178, 1182 (Utah App. 1994) (merely
cumulative, newly discovered evidence is insufficient); Joseph v. TerminixInt'l Co., 17 F.3d
1282, 1285 (10th Cir. 1994) (same). Melvin has repeatedly professed confusion about the
identity of his employer,6 yet this "newly discovered evidence" strongly supports this Court's
conclusion that plaintiff Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. is the real party in interest.
Melvin has taken violent offense at Franklin Covey Co.'s Consent to be Bound by
Judgment and Assignment. Based on a mistaken belief that this pleading somehow immunizes
Franklin Covey from liability, Melvin alleges the pleading is a fraud and asserts that Franklin
Covey's counsel lacked authority to submit the pleading. Melvin's virulent response to the
pleading seems to stem from the fact that he mistakes the document as an insufficient attempt to
effect an assignment, rather than merely providing notice to the Court that the assignment
occurred.7 Melvin fails to recognize that the pleading affords him two sources from which to

Consent to be Bound by Judgment and Assignment at 1-2; Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Defendant's
Second Motion to Dismiss at 2 n. 1; Franklin Covey's Memorandum in Opposition to Melvin's Motion for Sanctions
at 3-4; see also Melvin's 1997 W-2 from Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc., a copy of which is attached as Exhibit D
(originally provided to the Court as Exhibit A of Franklin Covey's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment).
6

Melvin has raised this issue no less than 11 times. See Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss or in the Alternative to Change Venue at 1-2; Defendant's Response to Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction or to Change Venue at 1-2, 6-7; Defendant's
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment at 1-7; Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss [Melvin's Second Motion to Dismiss] at 1-2; Melvin's Motion to Continue Hearing Date at 3; Defendant's
Response to Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Defendant's Second Motion to Dismiss at 1-4; Defendant's Objections to
Plaintiffs Proposed Order (dated July 15, 1998 and July 23, 1998) atffl[1-3; Motion for Extension of Time (dated
July 23, 1998) at % 1; Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Sanctions at fl 1-4.
7

Despite Melvin's professed confusion, it is obvious that the Consent was a pleading, not the actual
assignment. The Consent itself explains that "Franklin Covey Co. hereby acknowledges an assignment to Plaintiff
of any rights which may be necessary (if any) to entitle Plaintiff to prosecute this action as the real-party-ininterest." Exhibit E at 2 (emphasis added). The actual assignment was executed by Franklin Covey Co.'s President
G:\fral9023\100mclvin\Opp.M.Relief.wpd
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satisfy any entitlement he may establish, and is therefore to his benefit. Franklin Covey Co., as a
parent corporation, certainly had no obligation to agree to be bound by a judgment against its
subsidiary, Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. Moreover, Melvin's tantrum is irrelevant and
misguided for three reasons: (1) the identity of his employer is irrelevant to the outcome because
his employment relationship is governed by an undisputed agreement; (2) the Court was
presented with Melvin's W-2 establishing that his employer was Franklin Covey Client Sales,
Inc., (Exhibit D hereto) and (3) Melvin was provided with a copy of the actual assignment
executed by the President of Franklin Covey Co. and the Vice President of Franklin Covey
Client Sales, Inc. (Exhibit F hereto).
CONCLUSION
Melvin's Motions merely repeat defeated arguments and ask this Court to reach a
different result. Having failed to demonstrate any "mistake," "newly discovered evidence" or
"fraud," Melvin's 60(b) Motions must be denied.
DATED this 3 1

day of October, 1998.
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW &
BEDNAR, LLC

2f^/C
Steven C. Bednar
James L. Barnett
Attorneys for Plaintiff Franklin Covey
Client Sales, Inc.
and Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc.'s Vice President, a copy of which was previously provided to Melvin and is
attached hereto as Exhibit F. Melvin fails to explain how the filing of the Consent and the execution of the
Assignment by authorized individuals rises to the level offraud,much less how he was harmed by gaining
additional security.
G:\fral9023\100mclvin\Opp.M.Relief.wpd
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Franklin Covey's
Memorandum in Opposition to Melvin's Motions for Relief from Judgment or Order to be
mailed, postage prepaid, this AV ^ ^ a y of October, 1998, to the following:
Mark L. Hessel, Esq.
Suite 307
11501 Georgia Avenue
Wheaton, MD 20902
Marsha Ostrer
Ostrer & Associates
812 Whittington Terrace
Silver Springs, MD 20901
David Melvin
812 Whittington Terrace
Silver Springs, MD 20901
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EXHIBIT A

MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW
& BEDNAR, LLC
Steven C. Bednar #5660
Candice Anderson #7456
370 East South Temple, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)363-5678

n-jJEBP
3

f 4 1998

Attorneys for Plaintiff Franklin Covey
Client Sales, Inc.
SStyoST
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

FRANKLIN COVEY CLIENT SALES,
INC., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

v.
DAVID MELVIN, an individual,
Defendant.

Civil No. 980901616 MI
Judge David S. Young

Defendant David Melvin's Motion(s) to Dismiss and Plaintiff Franklin Covey Client
Sales, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment came before the Court on July 26,1998. Steven C.
Bednar appeared on behalf of Plaintiff Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. and on behalf of
Franklin Covey Co.1 Defendant David Melvin did not appear at the hearing. The Court

Franklin Covey Co. is not a named party to this action but has previously filed a pleading entitled Consent
to Be Bound By Judgment and Assignment.

#6793

oo^

announced the rulings set forth in this Order based upon the Memoranda submitted by the parties
and without oral argument.
The Court, having read briefs and memoranda submitted by the parties and the
accompanying attachments and having considered the relevant authorities, hereby orders as
follows: Defendant's Motion(s) to Dismiss are hereby DENIED.2 With respect to Plaintiff
Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment, there are no genuine issues
of material fact and Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment is therefore GRANTED.

David Melvin

2

Defendant David Melvin filed a Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative to Change Venue while this
action was pending in the United States District Court for the District of Utah. Defendant also filed a Motion to
Dismiss after remand to this Court Both Motions assert a lack of personal jurisdiction which the Court finds
unmeritorious. The Alterative Motion to Transfer Venue raised in Defendant's First Motion to Dismiss became
moot upon remand. Other arguments raised in Defendant's Motion(s) to Dismiss are subsumed in this Court's
ruling on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment
*6793
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EXHIBIT B

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW
& BEDNAR, LLC
Steven C. Bednar #5660
Candice Anderson #7456
370 East South Temple, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-5678

MjJm-,
s5*rLAKECOOmY . .
Deputy Ctaifc

Attorneys for Plaintiff Franklin Covey
Client Sales, Inc.
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
FRANKLIN COVEY CLIENT SALES,
INC., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

DAVID MELVIN, an individual,
Defendant.

DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT

Civil No. 980901616 MI
Judge David S. Young

The Court hereby enters judgment in this Declaratory Judgment Action as follows:
1.

Plaintiff Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. is a "person interested" under the Utah

Declaratory Judgment Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 et seq. Plaintiff is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Franklin Covey Co. Franklin Covey Co. has consented to be bound by the
Judgment filed in this action to the same extent as Plaintiff. This Declaratory Judgment is

M794

therefore binding upon both Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. and Franklin Covey Co.
(hereinafter "Franklin Covey.")1
2.

The Court hereby declares the rights, status, legal relations and obligations of

Franklin Covey and Defendant Melvin arisingfromDefendant Melvin's employment with
Franklin Covey as follows: (1) Franklin Covey has no contractual, implied or other obligation to
pay Defendant Melvin commissions or any other compensation related to seminars held or future
seminars scheduled to be held or products sold subsequent to the September 12, 1997 effective
date of Defendant Melvin's separationfromFranklin Covey; (2) the Release signed by Defendant
Melvin on November 13, 1997 bars all claims related to payment of compensation or
commissions for services performed by Melvin during his employment with Franklin; and (3)
Franklin's policy and practice with respect to the payment of commissions to separated Account
Executives is not violative of law.2
3.

The parties shall each bear their own costs and attorneys1 fees in this action.

The Court acknowledges that Defendant Melvin contends that his actual employer was Franklin Covey
Co. and not Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. However, the Courtfindsthat it is immaterial whether Defendant
Melvin was employed by Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. or Franklin Covey Co. This action concerns only one
employee, one employer, and only one employment relationship. The relevant terms of Defendant Melvin's
employment relationship are established by an undisputed compensation agreement under which the rights, status,
and legal relations of the parties are hereby determined.
2

The Court finds that the declaratory relief furnished herein is required under both Utah and Maryland
law. The Court is therefore not required to determine which law applies to this dispute.
#6794
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APPROVED AS TO FORM:

David Melvin

#6794
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EXHIBIT C

OSTRER Sc ASSOCIATES
812 Whittington Terrace
Silver Spring, Maryland 20901
(301) 593-9083 FAX (301) 593-2987
Email: Mostrer@edc.org

September 10, 1998

To:

Steven Bednar

From: Marsha Ostrer
Re:

Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. David Melvin

This will serve to confirm our conversation of September 9, 1998 in which I informed you
that I will be representing Mr. Melvin in the above en tided case. As I explained die Pro Hac
Vice papers have been completed and sent to local Utah counsel who has informed me diat
he will be filing diem this week.
Per our conversation once the papers are filed and approved please send all correspondence
and direct all communications to me. As you know, Mr. Melvin is my husband. To avoid
improper communications please address all mail to my attendon at the Whittington Terrace
address, contact me on the 9083 phone number and die 2987 fax number. My email address
is also included for your convenience. Furthermore, please forward all copies of any
documents, correspondence etc. related to this case direcdy to me once the Pro Hac Vice
papers have been approved. I believe that in the Maryland case while you did, in tact, have
local counsel, you requested our lawyer, Mr. Hessel, serve you direcdy and keep you
personally informed of all aspects of the case radier than dealing with local Maryland counsel
direcdy. I hereby make the same request of you regarding the Utah case.
I believe this covers die main topics of our conversation and addresses die issues you ask me
to address.

OSTRER & ASSOCIATES
812 Whittington Terrace
Silver Spring, Maryland 20901
(301) 593-9083 FAX (301) 593-2987
Email: Mostrer@edc.org

October 6,1998
To:

Steven Bednar

.

From: Marsha Ostrer Jlr
Re:

Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. David Melvin

In my letter to you of September 10, 1998,1 confirmed my intention of apolyingPro Hac
Vice to represent Mr. Melvin in the above entitled case. That intention remains, though
unfortunately the local counsel with whom I had made arrangements has succumbed to a
medical condition that has left him unable to complete the necessary tasks. He, and I, will
be deciding how to proceed this week.
However, as you know, there arefilingsand other matters that need to go forward in this
case. Therefore, Mr. Melvin will be proceeding^? se for die present Since I do not
formally represent him, I cannot speak on his behalf. I would suggest that the best way for
the two of you to communicate is as you have in the past - by letter and fax.
A communication from Mr. Melvin to you, along with additional items are enclosed.
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EXHIBIT E

MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW
& BEDNAR, LLC
Steven C. Bednar #5660
Candice Anderson #7456
370 East South Temple, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-5678

tea*
*"SS'oSgF

Attorneys for Plaintiff Franklin Covey
Client Sales, Inc.

WK

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

FRANKLIN COVEY CLIENT SALES,
INC., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

])
)
;)

FRANKLIN COVEY CO.
CONSENT TO BE BOUND BY
JUDGMENT AND ASSIGNMENT

j

V.

DAVID MELVIN, an individual,
Defendant.

i

Civil No. 980901616 MI

1

Judge David S. Young

Plaintiff Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. ("Plaintiff') is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Franklin Covey Co. Defendant David Melvin ("Defendant") contends that Franklin Covey Co.,
rather than Plaintiff, was his employer and is thus the real party-in-interest in this action.
Franklin Covey Co. hereby asserts that Plaintiff was, in fact, Defendant's employer during the
relevant time period and that Plaintiff is the real party-in-interest in this action. Nevertheless,
Franklin Covey Co. hereby consents to be bound by the Judgment entered in this action to the
same extent as Plaintiff, including any counterclaims which may be asserted by Defendant.

(*W

Further, Franklin Covey Co. hereby acknowledges an assignment to Plaintiff of anyrightswhich
may be necessary (if any) to entitle Plaintiff to prosecute this action as the real-party-in-interest
DATED this 2 _ day of June 1998.
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW & BEDNAR, LLC

Steven C. Bednar
Candice Anderson
Attorneys For Franklin Covey Co.

2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing FRANKLIN COVEY
CO. CONSENT TO BE BOUND BY JUDGMENT AND ASSIGNMENT to be mailed, postage
prepaid this
day of June, 1998 to the following:
Mark L. HesseL Esq.
Suite 307
11501 Georgia Avenue
Wheaton, MD 20902
David Melvin
812 Whittington Terrace
Silver Spring, Maryland 20901

Y

*J

V
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EXHIBIT F

ASSIGNMENT

THIS ASSIGNMENT is entered into effective the 1st day of January, 1998, by
and between FRANKLIN COVEY CO, a Utah corporation ("Assignor"),aad
FRANKLIN COVEY CLIENT SALES, INC, a Utah corporation ("Assignee").

Assignor assigns to Assignee any and all rights and obligations relating to or
arising out of David Melvin's employment with Assignor. Specifically, Assignor assigns
to Assignee any and all rights that may be necessary, if any, to entitle Assignee to
prosecute, as the real party in interest, any legal proceedings concerning David Mcivin.
Assignee hereby accepts Assignor's assignment of any and all rights and
obligations relating to or arising out of David Melvin's employment with Franklin Covey
Co.

FRANKLIN COVEY CO.

FRANKLIN COVEY CLIENT SALES,
INC.
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District
NOV, 10|998
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FRANKLIN COVEY CLIENT SALES
PLAINTIFF

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO. 980901616
DATE 11/10/987*
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG

vs
DAVID MELVIN
DEFENDANT

PLAINTIFF ATTY.
DEFENDANT ATTY.

BEDNAR, STEVEN C.
KAPLAN, NEIL A.
OSTRER, MARSHA A.

The Court has before it for decision four motions filed by
the Defendant David Melvin at a time when he was proceeding pro
se in this case. The Court notes that the Pro Hac Vice
application of Ms. Osterer was approved and signed by the Court
on October 30, 1998. As to the four motions up for decision, the
Court rules as follows:
1) Defendant's Motion for Extension of time for Appeal is
denied based on his non-compliance with the rules governing
appellate procedure. Under Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure (URAP), Defendant had 30 days from the date of judgment
in which to file a notice of appeal. The judgment was entered on

July 27, 1998, thus Defendant had until August 26 to file.
However, his notice of appeal was not filed until September 11.
Thus, Defendant then had to file a motion for extension of
time for appeal. Under Rule 4(e) of URAP, defendant could file an
ex parte motion for extension of time only within the first 30
days after judgment. Because he did not file his motion for
extension until September 22, 1998, it was required to be non exparte, that is, with notice to the other side. However, this
motion was ex parte, and thus was denied by the Court.
Subsequently, Defendant did file a motion for extension of time
and gave notice to plaintiff. This motion was filed on October 8.
However, under Rule 4(e), a non ex-parte motion for extension of
time must be filed within 60 days of the data of judgment. This
means that the motion for extension needed to be filed by
September 25. Having been filed October 8, the motion is
untimely, and, as stated, the motion for extension fo time for
appeal is denied.

2

2) Defendant's Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order
under Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

(URCP), is

denied. The Court finds that there is no basis for this motion.
Defendant has not demonstrated the existence of mistake, neglect,
newly discovered evidence or fraud that would warrant relief from
judgment.
3) Defendant's Motion to Stay Enforcement of Judgment is
denied. Though Rule 62 of the URCP does provide that a Court may
stay enforcement of judgment, there must be a showing by the
moving party that such stay is needed to prevent an injustice.
Defendant states no basis upon which a stay would be required to
prevent an injustice.
4) Defendant's Motion for Sanctions is denied. There is no
basis upon which this motion could be granted. Defendant contends
that Plaintiff's Counsel violated Rule 11 when it filed a
pleading on behalf of "Franklin Covey co." and not the party in
the case, "Franklin Covey Client Sales." Because of the fact that
"Franklin Covey Client Sales" is the wholly owned subsidary of
"Franklin Covey Co.", and because the relationship between these
two entities has been known to Defendant throughout, the Court
finds this argument without merit.
3

To reiterate, each of the four motions filed by the
defendant pro se and submitted to the Court are denied.
So ordered, this

jO®-—day

of November, 1998

HonorabTe^DAyiDxj
Third Difetricl

C<£

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 980901616 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail
Mail
Mail

Dated t h i s

/(* day of

/}&7)

NAME
MARSHA A OSTRER
812 Whittington Terrace
Silver Spring, MD 20901
STEVEN C BEDNAR
3 70 EAST SO TEMPLE SUITE 200
SALT LAKE CITY UT 841110000
NEIL A KAPLAN
ONE UTAH CNTR STE 1000
201 SOUTH MAIN STREET
SALT LAKE CITY UT
84111-2216

'

19

' ^

ML

Deputy Court Clerk

Page 1 (last)
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NEIL A. KAPLAN, Esq. #3974
CLYDE, SNOW, SESSIONS Sc SWENSON, P.C
1 Utah Center, Suite 1300
201 S. Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -2216

,~.V"

2

F-V:-._ ,
Thirr o j u„\.:. _ ;..ici

Telephone (801) 322-2516

DEC 0 8 1258

MARSHA A. OSTRER, Esq.
OSTRER & ASSOCIATES
812 Whitungton Terrace
Silver Spring, Maryland 20901
Telephone (301) 593-9083

SALTJL-.Xi CC

.^TY

OUCtAfa^
Cw~

Attorneys for Defendant David Melvin

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc..
Plaintiff Appellee
v.

Trial Court No: 980901616MI
Judge David S. Young
Supreme Court No. 981578

David Melvin,
Defendant/Appellant

NOTICE OF APPEAL
Notice is hereby given that David Melvin appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the final
judgment of the trial court entered in the above-entitled case on November 10, 1998.
This appeal is taken from the entire judgment entered on November 10, (998.

Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that on December^, 1998,1 served a copy of the foregoing Notice of
Appeal on counsel for the appellee, Steven Bednar 370 East South Temple, Suite 200,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 by first class mail, postage prepaid.

yu&fr
Weil (A. Kaplan

'

Datc:j)£<^W S,/T7*

yL'JMU
Neil Jt Kaplan

J

Marsha A. €fetrer
Attorney's for Appellant David
Melvin

(,M

OSTRER & ASSOCIATES
812 Whittingtoa Terrace
Silver Spring, Maryland 20901
(301) 593-9083 FAX (301) 593-2987
Email: mo6irei@edc.org

December 15, 1998

To:

Ms. Bunny Neuenschwander
Scott M. Matheson Courthouse
450 South State Street
3* Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

Re:

Confirmation of Acknowledgment of Filing of Transcript:
Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, Civil Case No. 980901616 MI

Dear Ms. Neuenschwander:
This is to acknowledge that a request for a transcript of the hearing held in the above
entitled case before Judge David S. Young on June 26, 1998 was requested and was
prepared, certified andfiledwith the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the certified copy having been transcribed and attested to on
September 23, 1998.
Further, this will acknowledge our conversation of last month in which you informed me
that you hadfiledan acknowledgment with the Clerk of the Supreme Court as previously
requested by my client, David Melvin
Thank you.
Sincerely,

)n^LLMarsh* ft. Ostrer
cc:

Clerk of the Third Judicial Court in and for Salt Lake County
Clerk, Utah Supreme Court
Mr. Steven Bednar, attorney for appellee
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

Franklin Covey Client Sales,
Inc., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

—00O00—- . _ JURIED DlSTRta COURT
Third Judicial District
imrajuuv,
fEB 0 4 1999 {
^

REMITTITUR
No.981578-SC

S * ° v ^ ^
Third District Court
Salt Lake Dept.
No. 980901616

vs.
David Melvin,
Defendant and Appellant.

Per ORDER OF DISMISSAL.

Order Issued:

December 9,1998

Remittitur Issued:

February 3,1999

Record:

None.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
Franklin Covey Client Sales,
Inc., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

No.

981578

v.
David Melvin,
Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER
Appellee's motion to dismiss this appeal is hereby
granted. The notice of appeal was not filed in a timely manner,
and this court lacks jurisdiction. Utah R. App. P. 10(a)(1).
BY THE COURT:
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Richard C. Howe
Chief Justice
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A P P E A R A N C E S

FOR THE PLAINTIFF
STEVEN C. BEDNAR ATTORNEY AT LAW
ATTORNEY AT LAW
370 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE, #300
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
FOR THE DEFENDANT:

NO APPEARANCE

•
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JUNE 2 6, 1995;

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH;
P R O C E E D I N G

THE MATTER OF FRANKLIN

THE COURT:
VS. DAVID MELVIN.

S

THIS IS CASE NUMBER

COVEY

98090116.

FOR THE RECORD, SIR, WILL YOU STATE YOUR NAME .
STEVEN BEDNAR:

STEVE BEDNAR ON BEHALF OF

FRANKLIN COVEY CLIENT SALES, INC.
THE COURT:

ALL RIGHT.

NOW, MR. BEDNAR, I

JUST WANT TO BRIEFLY RECITE SOME HISTORY, AS I
UNDERSTAND YOUR CASE.
APPARENTLY, THIS CASE WAS FILED, THEN
REMOVED TO THE FEDERAL

COURT.

JUDGE BENSON HAS

ISSUED ORDER THAT IT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN OVER
THERE.

I THINK IT DOES NOT MEET THE JURISDICTIONAL

FINANCIAL

LEVEL.
MR. BEDNAR:
THE COURT:

CORRECT.
AND IT HAS BEEN REMANDED

THIS COURT FOR FURTHER

PROCEEDINGS.

FILED A MOTION FOR SUMMARY

TO

AND YOU HAVE

JUDGEMENT ON THE BASIS

THAT YOU SHOULD HAVE NO OBLIGATION TO PAY BEYOND THE
DATE, IF I RECALL, OF SEPTEMBER 12, • 97 .
IS THAT ACCURATE?
MR. BEDNAR:

EXACTLY.

4
THE COURT:
CASE.

I'VE READ THE PLEADINGS IN THIS

I WILL TELL YOU THAT OBVIOUSLY THERE HAVE

BEEN SUBSTANTIAL PLEADINGS PILED IN OPPOSITION IN
YOUR CASE, AND THE PLEADINGS ARE PRO SE.
MR. MELVIN IS DOING THOSE HIMSELF, AND
LIKELY WITH HELP WITH HIS WIFE.

WE'VE HAD

SUBSTANTIAL CALLS FROM HIS WIFE, AND FINALLY

HAVE

HAD TO INDICATE, AND I'LL JUST STATE THIS BECAUSE I
AM ON THE RECORD, THAT WE COULD NO LONGER
COMMUNICATE WITH HER.

SHE WAS ASKING US

SUBSTANTIVE

QUESTIONS IN HIS BEHALF AND ACTING AS THOUGH SHE
WERE HIS ATTORNEY.
SO SINCE HE'S ACTING PRO SE, WE

INFORMED

HER THAT WE COULD ONLY COMMUNICATE WITH MR. MELVIN
PERSONALLY, OR WITH COUNSEL.
NOW, HE HAD A COUNSEL IN MARYLAND,

I THINK

HIS NAME WAS HESSELL.
MR. BEDNAR:

HE HAS COUNSEL IN MARYLAND.

THERE'S A PARALLEL PROCEEDING VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL TO
THIS ONE PENDING IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND.

COURT

HE'S REPRESENTED BY

MARK HESSELL IN THOSE PROCEEDINGS.
MR. HESSELL HAS AT LEAST ACTED AS NOTARY
PUBLIC ON SIGNING THE AFFIDAVITS.
THE COURT:

LIKELY DOING THE GHOST

PLEADING.
WELL, IT APPEARS TO ME THAT YOUR
IN RELATION TO SUMMARY

POSITION

JUDGMENT IS MERITORIOUS, THAT

THE CONTRACTS ARE CLEAR, THAT HIS WAIVER AT THE
CONCLUSION OF THE AGREEMENT WHEN HE RECEIVED THE
ULTIMATE COMPENSATION IN PLUS OR MINUS NOVEMBER OF
1997 BARS HIM FROM FURTHER ACTION IN THIS CASE.
SO YOUR MOTION IS GRANTED.

IF YOU'LL

PREPARE AN ORDER CONSISTENT WITH YOUR PLEADINGS AND
CONSISTENT WITH THE COURT'S
MR. BEDNAR:

RULING.

I WILL, YOUR

HONOR.

ONE OTHER MATTER THAT I SHOULD BRING TO
YOUR ATTENTION.

THERE IS A JURISDICTIONAL

THAT I SHOULD BRING TO YOUR ATTENTION.

MATTER

THERE IS A

JURISDICTIONAL MOTION THAT MR. MELVIN FILED, AND
THAT WAS FULLY BRIEFED BEFORE JUDGE

BENSON.

AND I WOULD WANT TO MAKE SURE THAT THE
COURT IS AWARE THAT THAT THERE IS A PERSONAL
JURISDICTION MOTION THAT IS PENDING AND THAT HAS
BEEN SUBMITTED FOR DECISION.
IF THE COURT WISHES TO REACH THAT, IT HAS
BEEN SUBMITTED AND IT'S FULLY BRIEFED.
THE COURT:

REMIND ME OF THE ISSUE.

I

THINK I'VE READ ALL THE PLEADINAGS.
MR. BEDNAR:

MR. MELVIN CONTENDS THAT HE IS

NOT SUBJECT TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN UTAH.
THE COURT:

DON'T YOUR UNDERLYING

CONTRACTS

ORIGINATE IN UTAH, AND ARE THEY SUBJECT TO
INTERPRETATION BY UTAH COURTS?
MR. BEDNAR:

THE LETTER AGREEMENT THAT

DETERMINES HIS COMPENSATION DOES NOT HAVE A CHOICE
OF LAW OR VENUE PROVISION.

OUR BASIS FOR

SUSTAINING

PERSONAL JURISDICTION IS THAT MR. MELVIN IN HIS
COMPLAINT IN MARYLAND ALLEGES THAT HE CAME HERE TO
UTAH, THAT HE CONDUCTED BUSINESS HERE BY ATTEMPTING
TO RECRUIT CLIENTS, AND HE IS SEEKING

COMPENSATION.

THAT VERY ACTIVITY, AND THAT, THEREFORE,

SPECIFIC

PERSONAL JURUSDICTION DOES EXIST.
BUT IT MAY BE WISE TO MAKE A RULING ON THAT
MOTION.
THE COURT:

ALL RIGHT.

THE COURT FINDS

THAT THERE IS PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE, AS
WELL, CONSISTENT WITH LAW AND THE PLEADINGS.
MR. BEDNAR:

AND I SHOULD MAKE AN ORDER FOR

BOTH MOTIONS, THEN?
THE COURT:
MR. BEDNAR:
THE COURT:
(PROCEEDINGS

INDEED.
THANK YOU, YOUR
THANK YOU.
CONCLUDED.)

HONOR.
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C E R T I F I C A T E

2

STATE OF UTAH

3

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE :

4

I, GAYLE B. CAMPBELL, AM AN EMPLOYEE OF THE

5
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STATE OF UTAH COURT
I

SYSTEM.

I TRANSCIBED THE FOREGOING TRANSCRIPT

FROM

7

VIDEOTAPED PROCEEDINGS TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITY.

8

THAT SAID TRANSCRIPT CONSTITUTES TO THE

9

BEST OF MY ABILITY A TRUE AND COMPLETE RECORD OF THE

10

PROCEEDINGS HAD.
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IN WITNESS THEREOF, I HAVE SUBSCRIBED MY
|

NAME AND SEAL THIS 23TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER,

1998.
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GAYLE B. CAMPBELL, CSR, RPR
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